The impact of foreign direct investment on unionized labor markets by Chung, Yu-Ri
The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on
Unionized Labor Markets
An Economic Analysis with Emphasis on Offshoring
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2012
vorgelegt von
Yu-Ri Chung
Referent: Prof. Dr. Carsten Eckel
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Gabriel Felbermayr
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 15. Mai 2013
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 06. Mai 2013
Namen der Berichterstatter: Carsten Eckel, Gabriel Felbermayr, Christian Holzner
To my parents and sister.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to many people who have accompanied me on this academic journey with
their invaluable knowledge, support and encouragement. First and foremost, I want to
thank my supervisor and co-author Prof. Carsten Eckel, whom I owe my deepest gratitude
for his never-tiring advice and guidance along the way. His enthusiasm and dedication
to the field of international trade theory has always been a source of inspiration and
motivation to me. Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude to Prof. Gabriel
Felbermayr, who kindly agreed to become my second supervisor and gave me helpful
comments on my research projects. I am also very grateful to Prof. Christian Holzner,
whom I was happy to win as my third examiner.
Special thanks go to my colleagues at the Chair of International Trade and Trade Policy,
Henrike Lindemann and Michael Irlacher, who have been invaluable both on an academic
and personal level. Moreover, I am thankful for the research support provided by our
student assistants Stefanie Baumgartner and Franziska Ehm as well as for the adminis-
trative help given by Roswitha Albert, Beate Doriat and Marion Kobras. Special mention
is deserved by Nadjeschda Arnold, Florian Buck, Tanja Greiner, Wolfgang Habla, Susanne
Hoffmann, Dominika Langenmayr, Mohammed Mardan, Ines Pelger, Heike Schenkelberg,
Lisa Stadler, Michael Wegener, Elisabeth Wieland and Kristina Zehmer for their academic
support and friendship.
I am very much indebted to Bernd for his infinite support and faith in me. Many thanks
also go to my friends from near and far; namely, Karin und Wolfgang, who have been great
supporters over the years. Last but not least, I dedicate this thesis to my parents and
sister, whose unconditional love has been an important driving force behind my pursuit
of contentment and happiness.
Contents
Preface 1
1 Offshoring, Trade Unions and Heterogenous Labor 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.1 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.2 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.3 Utility of the Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4 Solving for Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Impact of Increased Offshoring on the Unionized Labor Market . . . . . . . 17
1.3.1 Impact on Low- and High-Skilled Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.2 Impact on Relative Wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.3 Impact on Domestic Labor Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 The Impact of Labor Taxes on Unionized Labor Markets in the Pres-
ence of Offshoring 29
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.1 Profits and Allocation of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.2 Labor Taxation and Union Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Solving for Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.1 Optimal Output and Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.2 Wage Setting Behavior of the Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3 Offshoring Decision of the Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.4 Labor Taxation of the Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Contents ii
2.4 Impact of Labor Taxation and Increased Market Integration on Labor Mar-
ket Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Pattern Bargaining and FDI 54
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2 Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Autarky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.1 Simultaneous Bargaining without Outside Option (A) . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.2 Simultaneous Bargaining Based on Monopoly Levels (Am) . . . . . 61
3.3.3 Pattern Bargaining without Outside Option (B) . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.4 Pattern Bargaining Based on Monopoly Levels (Bm) . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.1 Pattern Bargaining and FDI without Outside Option (CFDI) . . . . 68
3.4.2 Pattern Bargaining and FDI based on Cournot Levels (CFDIm) . . . 71
3.4.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Bibliography 82
List of Tables
3.1 Outcomes under different bargaining regimes in autarky . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Wage rates under pattern bargaining and FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3 Union utility under pattern bargaining and FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Profits under pattern bargaining and FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
List of Figures
1.1 Optimal allocation of production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Effect of increased market integration on offshoring . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Direct and indirect effect of a fall in trade costs on the wage rate . . . . 20
1.4 Percental change of the wage rate for low- and high-skilled labor . . . . . 22
1.5 Effect of an increase in σ on the relative wage between low- and high-
skilled labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Total change of domestic labor demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 Effect of an increase in σ on the total change of domestic labor demand . 26
2.1 Optimal offshoring decision of the firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Effect of falling transportation costs on the optimal offshoring decision
of the firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 Negative effect on domestic labor due to falling trade costs . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Positive effect on domestic labor due to falling trade costs . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Influence of taxation on the total change of domestic labor demand when
trade costs fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.6 Total change in domestic labor demand due to fall in trade costs for a
sufficiently high tax rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.1 Long-term trend in the overall tax ratio (including social security con-
tributions) in % of GDP for the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Wage rates under pattern bargaining and FDI without outside option . . 75
3.2 Wage rates under pattern bargaining and FDI based on cournot levels . 76
3.3 Union utility under pattern bargaining and FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4 Conflict payoffs depending on the outside option of the union . . . . . . 78
3.5 Profits under pattern bargaining and FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Preface
Trade unions have a long tradition of playing an important economic and political role
in industrialized countries. In recent decades, trade unions have been confronted with
multiple challenges; namely, a decline in the number of union members as well as union
density across many countries (see Visser (2006)) and globalization as a complex and
multi-faceted ongoing process. One prominent feature generally associated with glob-
alization concerns Foreign Direct Investment (henceforth FDI), which has experienced
unprecedented growth rates over the past decades: worldwide FDI flows nearly tripled
alone between 1980 and 1990, when globalization became first apparent as a phenomenon
(see Graham and Krugman (1993)).
In general, economists distinguish between two forms of FDI: in the case of horizontal FDI,
multinational firms duplicate the production of (final) goods in different countries, whereas
in the case of vertical FDI, multinational firms decide to relocate different stages of a
production process to foreign countries. On a quantitative level, horizontal FDI represents
the bulk of FDI, but vertical FDI has come to rise in importance due to innovations in
communication and transportation technologies in recent years (see Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008)). Offshoring, in this context, refers to the case of vertical FDI, but
encloses the possibility of outsourcing as well, if outsourcing involves intermediate inputs
or tasks.
A widespread fear associated with offshoring (or FDI in general) concerns the loss of do-
mestic employment and thus loss of high-living standards through the transfer of jobs to
low-wage foreign countries, which regularly gives occasion for public and political debates.
The empirical evidence with regard to the impact of FDI on domestic wages and employ-
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ment is mixed at best, which requires a thorough theoretical analysis to understand and
explain differences in labor market outcomes. Surprisingly, the related economic literature
on collective bargaining and FDI is, despite the economic importance, relatively small:
not until recent years, the majority of the trade union literature lacked an international
dimension especially with regard to offshoring.
This dissertation aims to contribute to the economic analysis of the impact of FDI on
unionized labor markets. For this purpose, we consider certain key aspects related to
this topic. One key aspect addresses the different implications of horizontal and vertical
FDI for unionized labor markets. Contributions from authors such as Egger and Eckel
(2009) demonstrated that the option of horizontal FDI improves the fallback position
of the multinational firm during wage negotiations, which leads to an increase in the
wage elasticity of labor demand, resulting in wage moderation on behalf of the trade
unions. The exact opposite effect comes into force in the case of offshoring, because
the fragmentation of the production process forces domestic and foreign workers into
a complementary relationship, which enables the trade union to shut down the whole
production process in case of a strike. This effect, where the union finds itself in a better
bargaining position compared to the case of horizontal FDI which leads to an overall
decrease of the wage elasticity of labor demand, was first pointed out by authors such as
Skaksen and Sørensen (2001) and Lommerud et al. (2009). We pick up on this mechanism
by dedicating the first two chapters of this dissertation to the case of offshoring.
Another key aspect with regard to trade unions and FDI concerns the observation that
wage dispersion exists not only between but also within countries with regard to low- and
high-skilled workers. A general notion on this topic is that the relative wage of unskilled
workers in industrialized countries decreases under increased global competitive pressure.
We raise the question whether this assertion applies to unionized workers in the presence
of offshoring and a heterogenous labor force. Another key aspect that deserves attention
concerns the role of the government when the impact of offshoring on the unionized labor
market is analyzed and well-known. A last key aspect that we want to consider concerns
the coordination of collective bargaining itself, as variation is possible depending on the
degree of centralization of bargaining arrangements. This aspect is covered by the third
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chapter of this dissertation.
The first chapter, which represents joint work with Carsten Eckel, analyzes the impact of
increased offshoring on union wages and domestic employment for a heterogenous labor
force. Empirical evidence suggest that wage differences between countries remain substan-
tial on a global scale, which constitutes an explanation for the lasting inclination of firms
to relocate production processes from high-wage to low-wage countries. This trend has
been enforced by lower trade and communication costs as well as increased fragmentation
possibilities of the production chain, which led to a dramatic increase of offshoring as
efficiency-seeking sourcing of inputs from foreign countries (see Blinder (2006), Mankiw
and Swagel (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)). The perceived global
spread in wage differences can largely be attributed to labor market imperfections which
predominantly occur in industrialized countries. The labor markets in these countries
(especially with regard to Europe) are traditionally characterized by rigidities and the
existence of trade unions whose function is to enforce a mark-up on competitive wage
levels which creates unemployment. Furthermore, empirical studies perceive not only a
spread in wages between but also within countries when considering low- and high-skilled
worker groups that participate in global production activities.
Against this background, we develop a simple model in a small open economy with two
sectors. The focus lies on the sector that is characterized by monopolistic competition
and a heterogenous labor market where the interests of low-skilled workers are represented
by a monopoly union. Firms in this sector can choose to offshore the production of
intermediate goods to a low-wage foreign country under additional transportation costs
with the intention to re-import them back to the home country for final assembly. High-
skilled workers are assumed to be ‘managers’ to these firms and receive all surplus profits
as factor compensation.
Given this setting, we aim to answer the question of how falling trade costs affect the firms’
optimal offshoring decision and the relative factor reward between low- and high-skilled
workers. Furthermore, in the light of falling trade costs, we are interested in the change of
domestic labor demand. As a result, this chapter shows that a fall in trade costs induces
more offshoring as well as an increase in the wage rates for both low- and high-skilled labor.
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Which wage effect dominates over the other depends on the initial degree of offshoring:
the relative wage between low- and high-skilled labor is likely to rise when the initial
degree of offshoring is neither too low or too high and likely to decrease for offshoring
degrees in between. With respect to domestic employment, we find that labor demand is
likely to be negative for relatively low and relatively high initial degrees of offshoring and
likely to be positive for offshoring degrees in between. Our results contradict the general
notion that the relocation of production stages to a low-wage foreign country is always
harmful to domestic employment.
The second chapter studies the impact of labor taxation on union wages and domes-
tic employment in the presence of offshoring. Empirical evidence shows that developed
countries are generally characterized by relatively high tax ratios. This assertion applies
in particular to European countries, whose overall tax ratio (as sum of taxes and social
security contributions) add up to 38,4 percent in the GDP-weighted average of the 27
EU member states, compared to 26,9 percent in Japan and 24,8 percent in the USA (see
European Commission (2012)). The persistent high tax burden on labor is often believed
to be a main source for high unemployment in these countries. A popular idea in the
fiscal policy debate concerns the reduction of labor taxes in the hope that lower labor
costs induce higher labor demand. Given this situation in the presence of offshoring and
unionized labor markets, we address the question how policy makers can optimize their
fiscal policy strategy when being confronted with increased market integration.
For this purpose, we consider a single representative firm in a small open economy that
has the opportunity to relocate the production of required intermediate inputs to a low-
wage foreign country. The domestic workers employed by the firm are represented by a
monopoly trade union and pay personal income tax on their earnings that is collected by
the government. The focus of our analysis is directed towards wages and employment in
the high-wage domestic country. Given this setup, we investigate how the trade union
alters its wage-setting behavior in response to changes in offshoring opportunities and to
changes in the marginal tax parameter.
Our findings in this chapter are the following: firstly, we find a negative relationship
between taxation and domestic labor demand, meaning that an increase in the marginal
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tax rate reduces domestic labor. This is because an increase of the marginal labor tax rate
leads the union to demand higher wages. This effect is even reinforced because increases
in the union wage rate induce further offshoring, which in turn leads to even higher wage
demands by the union to compensate for the loss of domestic employment. Secondly,
when the considered economy is confronted with falling transportation costs, we find that
the total effect on domestic labor crucially depends on the initial degree of labor taxation.
In this context, a negative effect on domestic labor is more likely the lower the marginal
tax rate and the lower the initial degree of offshoring. The government can dampen
this negative on domestic labor induced by a fall in transportation costs by raising the
marginal tax rate. If the tax rate is sufficiently high, increased offshoring may even induce
a raise in domestic labor demand, depending on the initial degree of offshoring. The most
interesting result of this chapter lies in the implication that an increase in the tax rate
can be beneficial with respect to domestic labor.
The third chapter introduces the option of horizontal FDI into a model of pattern bargain-
ing that constitutes a sequential wage negotiation practice, where the union first chooses
a target firm to negotiate a wage rate. This outcome then serves as a pattern for all sub-
sequent negotiations where, in a strict sense, the union makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to the remaining firms or where, in a more loose sense, the agreed upon wage rate with
the target firm serves as a precedent. When the strict form of pattern bargaining applies
and there is agreement among all participants (enforced through strikes if necessary),
uniform wage rates across firms are the result. The economic reasoning as to why trade
unions might prefer pattern bargaining over other forms of bargaining coordination can
be explained by the so-called ‘taking labor out of competition’ argument: unionized firms
in oligopolistic markets usually have an incentive to bargain hard on wages, since lower
wages constitute a competitive advantage over market competitors. Pattern bargaining,
however, takes the edge out of this incentive, as wage concessions become more acceptable
when all other firms agree to them as well, which is in the interest of the union.
In our model, FDI endows firms with a fallback position in case wage negotiations fail,
which strengthens their bargaining position. In summary, we compare bargaining en-
vironments for the case of autarky and the case of an open economy with FDI, while
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distinguishing between alternatives where the union may or may not be endowed with a
conflict payoff in case wage negotiations fail.
Our main findings are the following: Firstly, FDI lowers the union’s wage rate compared to
the autarkic case under pattern bargaining. This is because FDI enables firms to produce
output from abroad when the union decides to go on strike in the firm’s domestic country,
which represents a credible threat and therefore better bargaining position during wage
negotiations. Secondly, we find that the union is always better off in a more decentralized
bargaining environment which allows for a positive conflict payoff. The economic reason
for this result goes beyond the argument that a positive conflict payoff improves the
bargaining position of the union, because it alters the conflict payoff to the firm as well.
A positive conflict payoff to the union implies that a firm still remains active in the market
even when the wage negotiation with another firm fails. This other firm will consequently
produce output from abroad to serve the domestic market yet the corresponding conflict
payoff is now based on less market share, because the other domestic firm prevails in
the market. This mechanism that enhances the outside option of the union can offer an
explanation for the trend towards collective bargaining agreements on a more decentralized
level. Third, given the choice, the union prefers the domestic rather than the multinational
firm to be the target firm. This result can be attributed to the specific procedure that is
attributed to pattern bargaining.
All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own introduc-
tions and appendices such that they can be read independently.
Chapter 1
Offshoring, Trade Unions and
Heterogenous Labor1
1.1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that globalization creates increasing competitive pressure between
countries, which has led to strong unprecedented implications for the corresponding labor
markets. Empirical evidence suggests that wage differences between countries remain sub-
stantial on a global scale, which constitutes an explanation for the lasting inclination of
firms to relocate production processes from high-wage to low-wage countries.2 This trend
has been enforced by lower trade and communication costs as well as increased fragmen-
tation possibilities of the production chain, which, according to the analysis of US data
by several authors such as Blinder (2006), Mankiw and Swagel (2006) and Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006), led to a dramatic increase of offshoring as efficiency-seeking sourc-
ing of inputs from foreign countries.3 Given the phenomenon offshoring, the perceived
global spread in wage differences can largely be attributed to labor market imperfections
1This chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Dr. Carsten Eckel.
2Sinn (2007) finds that the average wage cost in the manufacturing industry ranged from 1,10 Euro
in China to above 27 Euro in countries like Denmark, West Germany and Norway.
3Following authors such as Yeaple (2006), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodríguez-Clare
(2010), we understand offshoring as the movement of the production of inputs (or intermediate goods
and services) to a foreign country with the intention of reimporting them back to the home country.
This can occur within the firm (= vertical FDI) or through arms-length transactions (= international
outsourcing). Note that the terms vertical FDI and international outsourcing can be used interchangeably
in the context of our model if the offshored activities are complementary in their nature.
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which predominantly occur in industrialized countries. The labor markets in these coun-
tries (especially with regard to Europe) are traditionally characterized by rigidities and
the existence of trade unions whose function is to enforce a mark-up on competitive wage
levels, which creates unemployment.4
Empirical studies perceive not only a spread in wages between but also within countries
when considering low- and high-skilled worker groups that participate in global production
activities. A general notion on wage inequality is that the relative wage of unskilled
workers decreases in industrialized countries. Feenstra and Hanson (1996), for example,
find for the case of outsourcing a decline in the relative wage of unskilled workers. Jones
(2000), on the other hand, adverts to the possibility that the relative wage of unskilled
workers in developed countries may increase if labor-intensive production processes are
relocated abroad.5
Against the background of offshoring, wage dispersion and the fact that substantial num-
bers of workers in industrialized countries are covered by collective bargaining agreements,
we aim to answer the question of what impact trade unions have on labor market outcomes
under heterogenous labor and firms’ organizational choices in the presence of offshoring.
This question has received relatively little attention in theoretical and empirical litera-
ture. First and foremost, there are relatively few contributions that deal with offshoring
in the vast literature on trade unionism. Most authors consider horizontal FDI and/or
outsourcing of final goods when analyzing labor market outcomes of trade unions in open
economies, which is usually associated with wage moderation on behalf of trade unions
(see for example Zhao (1998), Eckel and Egger (2009)). Offshoring, however, offers an
exact opposite implication; namely, higher union wage demands in response to increased
offshoring. Examples of authors who first pointed to this effect are Skaksen and Sørensen
(2001), Zhao (2001) and Lommerud et al. (2009). All refer to the complementary nature
of inputs for the production process that enables trade unions to maintain their bargaining
4See, for example, Blanchflower (2007), who provides an overview of international patterns of union
membership in 30 OECD and 11 non-OECD countries.
5Further examples include Geishecker and Görg (2008), who show for the case of outsourcing that
there may be winners and losers with regard to (general) wage levels depending on skill classification
of workers. Braun and Scheffel (2007) provide empirical evidence on the effect of outsourcing on union
wages for the case of Germany. They find that high- and low-skilled workers (working in industries with
high outsourcing intensities) experience a rise and respectively, decline in the union wage premium, while
medium-skilled workers remain largely unaffected.
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power even when faced with offshoring, as a strike would lead to a complete shutdown of
the production process, which leaves firms with no outside option. Horizontal FDI and/or
outsourcing of final goods, in contrast, enable firms to gain flexibility in production, as
the entire production of goods can be relocated to a foreign country when confronted with
a strike by the union. Nevertheless, most contributions on trade unionism and offshoring
consider a homogenous labor force only, which is somewhat of a drawback, as most related
empirical studies include different skill groups in their estimations, which suggests a gap
between theoretical predictions and empirical findings. This paper aims to bridge this gap
by allowing for heterogenous labor in the context of trade unions and offshoring. To this
end, we consider a model in a small open economy where the focus lies on the sector that
is characterized by monopolistic competition and a heterogenous labor market where the
interests of low-skilled workers are represented by a monopoly union. Firms in this sector
can choose to offshore part of the production to a low-wage foreign country under addi-
tional transportation costs with the intention to re-import the offshored (intermediate)
goods back home for final assembly. High-skilled workers are assumed to be ’managers’
to these firms and receive all surplus profits as factor compensation.
Given this setting, we address the following questions: How does increased market inte-
gration affect the firms’ choice of allocation of production? 6 How does this affect relative
factor rewards between high- and low-skilled workers and what are the employment im-
plications from the high-wage country’s perspective? We find that falling trade costs lead
to increased offshoring. This has the effect of higher wages for both low- and high-skilled
workers. The union demands higher wages in the process of wage negotiations to com-
pensate for the loss in domestic employment. The union is able to enforce higher wages
due to the complementary nature of the production process associated with offshoring.
High-skilled workers, so-called managers, gain higher wages from offshoring as it enables
firms to become more profitable. Given the result that both skill groups experience higher
wages under increased offshoring, the relative wage of unskilled labor is likely to increase
when the initial degree of offshoring is relatively low or high and likely to decrease, when
the initial degree of offshoring lies in between where it is neither too low or high. Increased
6The process of trade liberalization is modeled as a gradual reduction in the per unit cost associated
with offshoring.
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offshoring may increase or decrease total labor demand in the home country depending on
the initial value of offshoring, where labor demand is likely to increase with intermediate
levels of initial offshoring.
There are, to the best of our knowledge, two previous contributions that are closely related
to our work on offshoring, trade unions and heterogenous labor. Egger and Kreickemeier
(2008) develop a general equilibrium model of international fragmentation under het-
erogenous labor, but do not consider trade unions in their analysis. Instead, Egger and
Kreickemeier build on a so-called fairness approach to efficiency wages as a source of labor
market imperfections. Koskela and Stenbacka (2010) develop a partial equilibrium model
to investigate the effects of outsourcing on wage formation and equilibrium unemploy-
ment in a heterogenous labor market. However, two restrictive assumptions apply, which
differ from our model. First, there is no international fragmentation of production which
implies complete substitutionality between activities moved abroad and those remaining
in the home country. This has differing implications for the bargaining power of the firm.
Second, the objective function of the trade union is based on wage solidarity between high-
and low-skilled workers, whereas we consider low-skilled workers to be the only workers
that are represented by a trade union.
The remainder of this paper is given as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic structure
of the model. Section 3 analyzes the effect of falling transportation costs on key variables
of the model. Finally, concluding comments are presented in Section 4.
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1.2 The Basic Model
1.2.1 Demand
Consider a two-sector model in a small high-wage country where homogenous (numeraire)
good Q and differentiated good X are produced respectively. The preferences of a repre-
sentative consumer are given by CES utility
U = X +Q =
(∫ N
0
x (i)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
+Q , (1.1)
whereX is a function over a continuum of goods indexed by i with N denoting the number
of firms and thus the mass of available varieties in the differentiated goods sector. All
varieties are considered to be substitutes where σ constitutes the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties with σ > 1. Using the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) approach we
obtain optimal consumption for variety x(i):
x (i) = A p (i)−σ , (1.2)
where A ≡ P σ−1I is treated as a constant due to our small country assumption with P
as aggregate price and I as world income.
1.2.2 Production
The production of homogenous good Q is characterized by a perfectly competitive product
and labor market. Differentiated good X is produced in an environment of monopolis-
tic competition where firms choose to produce a different variety x(i) under identical
productivity. Both sectors require labor as the only factor of production: labor LQ is
homogenous in sector Q, whereas labor in sector X is split between high-skilled ’man-
agerial’ workers LH and low-skilled ’normal’ workers L. The manufacturing process is
characterized by fragmentation: following the approach by Feenstra and Hanson (1996,
1997) final good variety x(i) is assembled from a continuum of complementary interme-
Offshoring, trade unions and heterogenous labor 12
diate goods that are indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each intermediate good y(z(i)) is produced
with a linear-homogenous technology where each unit is associated with a specific unit
labor requirement γ(z(i)) that increases linearly with z. The production function can be
written as
x(i) = min
(
L(z)
γ(z)
)
∀ z ∈ [0, 1], (1.3)
where L(z) stands for total usage of low-skilled labor in y(z(i)).
Furthermore, each firm producing variety x(i) faces a monopoly union which represents
all low-skilled workers employed by the firm within a ’right-to-manage’ framework.7 Fac-
tor compensation is arranged as such that low-skilled workers receive wage rate w(i) as
outcome of the wage setting decision of the monopoly union, whereas high-skilled workers
receive all excess profits of the firms in sector X (which is thought of as wage rate wH).8
In terms of offshoring, we allow each firm to have some flexibility regarding the location
of intermediate good production: intermediate goods can be produced at home or alter-
natively abroad in a low-wage foreign country where per unit transportation costs t apply
to offshored intermediates. To accommodate the assumption that the foreign country is
a low-wage country, foreign wage rate w∗ is assumed to be smaller than reservation wage
ω of domestic sector Q where Q = ωLQ. The overall reintegration of intermediate goods
into final assembly is assumed to take place in the home country at no cost. We further
assume that the wage differential between high- and low-wage country is sufficiently high,
or respectively, that transportation costs are sufficiently low, that initially there is always
some extent of offshoring.9 The corresponding unit cost function is given by
c (i;w,w∗, t, z˜) ≡ w (i)
∫ z˜(i)
0
γ (z) dz + w∗
∫ 1
z˜(i)
γ (z) dz + (1− z˜ (i)) t, (1.4)
where z˜(i) marks the cut-off point at which each firm is indifferent between producing y(z˜)
7The term right-to-manage refers to a modus operandi where the firm has the right to choose em-
ployment for a given union wage level according to its profit maximization scheme .
8Excess labor demand or supply of low-skilled workers in the differentiated goods sector is assumed
to be provided for or absorbed by the homogenous good sector Q.
9It is straightforward to check that the extent of offshoring depends on unit labor requirement γ(z),
given factor prices and transportation costs. Intermediate goods with relatively high values of z indicate
labor-intensive production and thus higher values of unit labor requirement γ(z). The low-wage country
posseses a cost advantage in this case. Conversely, the high-wage home country can produce intermediate
goods at lower cost for relatively low values of z.
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at home or in a foreign country. z˜(i) implies that all intermediates in the range [0, z˜(i))
are produced at home whereas all intermediates in the range (z˜(i), 1] are produced abroad.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 1.1 where linearity is assumed for simplicity.
Figure 1.1: Optimal allocation of production
Given equations (2.2) and (2.3), each firm’s profit equals
Π = (p (i)− c)x (i)− wH . (1.5)
Note that we let high-skilled managers be inelastically supplied at their aggregate
level with LH = N as high-skilled labor market clearing condition. This implies that LH
determines market entry in sector X. Because all excess profits are distributed among
high-skilled managers, firms consider wH as given market variable.
1.2.3 Utility of the Union
The labor market in sector X is imperfect in the sense that all low-skilled workers in each
firm are represented by a monopoly union. The objective of the monopoly union is given
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by the rent maximization function
Ω (i) = (w (i)− ω)L(i) (1.6)
with labor demand for unskilled workers being defined as
L(i) = x(i)
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz. (1.7)
At this point it is important to note that the union has an outside-option by going on
strike and receiving reservation wage ω in case of disagreement, whereas the firm has no
conflict payoff due to the complementary nature of intermediate goods in the production
process: a strike against intermediate good production in the domestic country results in
a shutdown of the entire production process of final good variety x(i) which preserves
the bargaining power of the union.10 This has an important implication for our model as
unions demand higher wages to compensate for the loss in domestic employment when
faced with offshoring. This implication is very different from models that include horizon-
tal FDI or outsourcing of final goods (as potential or real threat) in which case firms can
produce output even in the event of a strike by relocating complete production processes
abroad, resulting in lower wage demands by the union. These opposing implications are
important to keep in mind as we continue our analysis of the model.
1.2.4 Solving for Equilibrium
The introduced framework is solved through backwards induction in a three-stage se-
quence of decision making.11 Each stage can be described as follows:
10Zhao (2001) states empirical examples for this kind of situation where labor strikes against General
Motors in Canada and the US in 1996 and 1998 led to a shutdown of production plants in other countries
such as Mexico.
11The underlying timing structure captures the idea of a long-term oriented production mode where
the allocation of production is inflexible at the stage when wages are set by the monopoly union. Koskela
and Schöb (2010) term this sequence of events as ‘strategic’ decision-making. Alternatively, the term
‘flexible’ decisision-making applies if stage 1 and 2 were reversed where the wage is determined before the
firms’ offshoring decision. All in all, the specific timing of events has no effect on the qualitative results
of our model.
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Stage 1: The firm determines the extent of offshoring
Stage 2: The monopoly union sets the domestic wage rate
Stage 3: The firm determines output and employment.
In Stage 3, the firm determines output and employment within its profit maximization
scheme for a given level of z˜ and wage rate w(i). Usage of equation (1.2) under symmetry
assumption yields the first order condition from the profit function in (3.2) with
p = σ
σ − 1c (1.8)
and
x = A(σ − 1)
σ
σσ
c−σ. (1.9)
The corresponding profit maximization function is given by
Π = Θ c1−σ − wH (1.10)
with Θ = A(σ−1)
σ−1
σσ
. Equation (2.9) allows us to further specify wH because all excess
profits are assumed to be paid out to high-skilled managers:
wH = Θ c1−σ. (1.11)
Substituting equation (1.9) into (1.7) yields the profit-maximizing firm-level employment
of unskilled labor:
L(i) = A(σ − 1)
σ
σσ
c−σ
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz. (1.12)
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Let us now consider Stage 2, where the monopoly union maximizes its objective function
according to
w(i) = arg max
w(i)
{(w (i)− ω)L(i)} (1.13)
subject to the firm’s labor demand curve in (2.10). This implies that the monopoly union
chooses its optimal wage such that its marginal rate of substitution of employment for
wages is equal to the elasticity of the firm’s labor demand. Solving (2.12) for w(i) yields
w(i) = σω
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz + w∗
∫ 1
z˜ γ (z) dz + (1− z˜) t
(σ − 1) ∫ z˜0 γ (z) dz (1.14)
for given z˜. Comparative static analysis of (1.14) reveals that the union wage for unskilled
workers decreases both in σ and z˜:
∂w(i)
∂σ
< 0 ∂w(i)
∂z˜
< 0. (1.15)
Given the profit-maximizing scheme of each firm (Stage 3) and the wage setting behavior
of the monopoly union (Stage 2), we can now determine each firm’s optimal offshoring
decision of production (Stage 1). Differentiation of (2.9) with respect to z˜ yields
dΠ
dz˜(i) = Θ (1− σ) c (i)
−σ dc (i)
dz˜ (i) −
dwH
dz˜ (i) = 0, (1.16)
where dwH
dz˜(i) = 0 because firms take wH as given. It follows from (1.16) that profit maxi-
mization with respect to z˜ is fulfilled when
ωγ (z˜)− w∗γ (z˜) = t, (1.17)
where internal solution requires ω > w∗.12 Given equation (1.17) we can determine the
relative wage between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in equilibrium:
12In the following, we will omit the (i) index for firms due to our symmetry assumption.
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w
wH
=
(
σ
σ − 1
)(2σ−1)
σω
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz + w∗
∫ 1
z˜ γ (z) dz + (1− z˜) (ω − w∗) γ (z˜)
A
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
(
ω
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz + w∗
∫ 1
z˜ γ (z) dz + (1− z˜) (ω − w∗) γ (z˜)
)1−σ
(1.18)
with
∂
∂ω
(
w
wH
)
> 0 ∂
∂w∗
(
w
wH
)
> 0 ∂
∂z˜
(
w
wH
)
< 0 ∂
∂σ
(
w
wH
)
≶ 0.
1.3 Impact of Increased Offshoring on the Unionized
Labor Market
Trade liberalization is considered to be a catalyzer for globalization. We incorporate this
effect into our model by analyzing the impact that falling trade costs have on the domestic
labor market with specific focus on the relative wage between high-skilled and low-skilled
workers. The direct effect of a fall in t involves the reduction of marginal production
costs for every offshored intermediate and thus a change in the allocation of production.
Differentiation of equation (1.17) shows that falling t implies a lower value of z˜:
dz˜
dt
= 1(ω − w∗) γ′ (z˜) > 0 (1.19)
with γ′(z˜) > 0 via rearrangement of d2pi
dz˜2 which establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A fall in trade costs leads to increased offshoring.
This intuitive result can be depicted when recalling Figure 1.1 in Section 1.2.2, where a
fall in t leads to a downward shift of the w2γ(z) + t curve as shown in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Effect of increased market integration on offshoring
1.3.1 Impact on Low- and High-Skilled Wages
Falling transportation costs influence the bargained wage rate through a direct and in-
direct channel, which work in opposite directions. On the one hand, lower trade costs
induce an increase in the wage elasticity of labor demand, because lower trade costs cause
wage increases, ceteris paribus, to have a larger impact on marginal production costs with
the result that wage increases have a larger impact on domestic labor demand. We term
this direct effect on the union wage as wage moderation effect. On the other hand, lower
trade costs give rise to increased offshoring, which reduces the wage elasticity of labor
demand, because offshoring causes wage increases to have a smaller impact on marginal
production costs, as less unionized workers remain employed in the home country. A less
elastic labor demand implies that the trade-off between wages and employment works in
favor of the union, resulting in higher wage demands. We term this effect on the union
wage rate as offshoring effect on wages, thereby keeping in mind that union wages increase
with offshoring.
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The corresponding function that describes the total effect of a change in t on the union
wage rate is given by:
dw
dt
=
+
∂w
∂t
+
−
dw
dz˜
+
dz˜
dt
(1.20)
=
(1− z˜) (ω − w∗)
(
γ′ (z˜)
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz − (γ (z˜))2
)
− γ (z˜)
(
ω
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz + w∗
∫ 1
z˜ γ (z) dz
)
(σ − 1)
(∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
)2
(ω − w∗) γ′ (z˜)
.
Given (1.20), the overall effect on the union wage rate appears not clear-cut: the denom-
inator of (1.20) is clearly positive while the numerator appears ambiguous. To find an
answer to this question, let us assume a specific linear function for γ (z) such as γ (z) = z.13
Expression (1.20) then takes the form
dw
dt
= − 2 (w
∗ (1− z˜) + z˜ω)
(z˜)3 (σ − 1) (ω − w∗) < 0, (1.21)
which indicates a clear negative algebraic sign. This implies that the offshoring effect
on wages dominates over the wage moderation effect for all z˜ ∈ [0, 1], so that the overall
wage elasticity of labor decreases with falling t. For a better intuition, we portray each
effect in Figure 1.3, in which the wage moderation effect and offshoring effect on wages
are depicted in black and blue color respectively.
In the next step we can determine the total effect of a change in t on the managers’ wage:
dwH
dt
= (1− σ) A (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
c−σ

+
∂c
∂t
+
+
∂c
∂z˜
+
dz˜
dt
+
+
∂c
∂w
−
dw
dt
 (1.22)
= −A
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
c−σ (1− z˜) < 0,
which primarily depends on the degree of offshoring and the cost structure of the firm as
endogenously determined variables of our model for a given level of A and σ. In this case
we can unambiguously assign a negative algebraic sign.
13The quality of our results hold independent of the specific function for γ(z) as long as the function
takes a positive linear form.
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Figure 1.3: Direct and indirect effect of a fall in trade costs on the wage rate
When applying γ (z) = z, function (1.22) takes the form
dwH
dt
= −A
(
σ − 1
σ
)2σ−1 (1− z˜)(
1
2
(
w∗ + (ω − w∗)
(
2z˜ − (z˜)2
)))σ < 0. (1.23)
Given equations (1.20) - (1.23), we can conclude that both wage types for low- and high-
skilled wages increase with falling t. The wage for low-skilled union workers increases
because the monopoly union demands higher wages in reaction to the higher degree of
offshoring which constitutes a loss of domestic jobs to the foreign country. The union is
able to enforce these higher wages due to the complementary nature of the production
process which leaves the firm no outside-option in case of a strike. On the other hand,
the wage for high-skilled managers is linked to the profits of the firm where the direction
of the change in wH determines the total gain or loss for this labor group. Since wH
increases with falling t, profits must rise (via output) as well:
dx
dt
= −Aσ
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
c−σ−1 (1− z˜) < 0, (1.24)
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dΠ
dt
= −A
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
c−σ (1− z˜) < 0. (1.25)
Proposition 2 Increased offshoring (as a result of falling trade costs) leads to a rise of
nominal wages for both low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
1.3.2 Impact on Relative Wage
The total change of the relative wage between low- and high-skilled workers in the light
of falling transportation costs is determined by the elasticities of w and wH in response
to a change in t:
ηw =
dw
dt
t
w
= − 2 (1 + z˜)
2z˜ (6z˜ + 2) + (1− z˜)2 , (1.26)
ηwH =
dwH
dt
t
wH
= 8κ (1− z˜)
4
7
(
(z˜)2 − 2z˜ − 1
) . (1.27)
If the percental change of the union wage rate is larger than the percental change in the
managers’ wage rate, ηw > ηwH , the relative wage wwH will increase in response to a fall
in t and decrease respectively, when ηw < ηwH . Both scenarios are possible and depend
on the initial degree of z˜ when the fall in transportation costs occurs. To illustrate this,
consider Figure 1.4, where equations (1.26) and (1.27) are depicted with exemplary values
in accordance with the internal requirements of our model.
Analysis of Figure 1.4 reveals a concave shaped function for ηw, which represents the
percental change of the wage rate of low-skilled labor in response to a fall in t. The values
of the function are negative because the negative offshoring effect on wages dominates over
the positive wage moderation effect for all z˜ ∈ [0, 1]. The percental change of ηw is largest
when the initial degree of offshoring is relatively high (which corresponds to low values
of z˜) with a maximum at z˜ = 0, when all offshoring opportunities are exhausted. This
is because the scope for the offshoring effect on wages is positively linked to the degree
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Figure 1.4: Percental change of the wage rate for low- and high-skilled labor
of offshoring.14 The relationship between ηwH and z˜ takes a u-shaped form where ηwH
reaches a maximum at intermediate offshoring levels. To understand this, recall that the
compensation of high-skilled labor is negatively linked to production costs. High levels of
z˜ indicate high transportation costs so that the initial degree of offshoring is relatively low
for these levels and vice versa. At z˜ = 1, the firm produces all intermediate goods in the
home country, thereby leaving t no scope to lower production costs as they would depend
on domestic variables only. As offshoring progresses with falling t, compensation of high-
skilled workers increase as well, but so does the compensation of low-skilled workers until
the scope to further save on costs through falling transportation costs is exhausted at
z˜ = 0.
In comparison, the relative wage between low- and high-skilled workers is likely to increase
due to a fall in t, when the value of z˜ is relatively low or high and likely to decrease with
intermediate initial values of z˜, that lie in between. Moreover, an exogenous increase in
σ produces an even wider bandwith of initial values of z˜ that represents a reduction in
the relative wage between low- and high-skilled workers as depicted in Figure 1.5. This is
because we observe an upward shift of the ηw curve and a simultaneous downward-shift
14The wage moderation effect becomes larger with increased offshoring as well, but always less so
compared to the offshoring effect on wages.
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of the ηwH curve with increasing elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Figure 1.5: Effect of an increase in σ on the relative wage between low- and high-skilled
labor
We can summarize our results with regard to the impact of a change in t on the relative
wage between low- and high-skilled workers in the following way:
Proposition 3 The relative wage between low- and high-skilled labor is likely to increase
when the initial degree of offshoring is relatively low or high and likely to decrease with
an intermediate initial degree of offshoring that lies in between.
1.3.3 Impact on Domestic Labor Demand
Now that we have analyzed the impact of falling transportation costs on the relative wage
between low- and high-skilled workers, we turn to the question of how domestic labor
demand for low-skilled union workers is affected by a fall in t (as the number of high-
skilled managers is fixed by assumption). This question is relevant since the monopoly
union values its utility by means of rent maximization, which consists of both wages and
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labor demand for union workers. The total impact of falling transportation costs and thus
increased offshoring on firm-level employment of low-skilled workers is given by
dL
dt
= xγ (z˜)
+
dz˜
dt
+
∫ z˜
0
γ (z) dz
−
dx
dt
(1.28)
= A
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
c−σ
(
γ (z˜)
(ω − w∗) γ′ (z˜) −
σ2
(σ − 1)c
−1 (1− z˜)
∫ z˜
0
γ (z) dz
)
.
It is clear from viewing (1.28) that the total effect on domestic labor demand due to a
fall in t depends on the algebraic sign in the bracket of this expression, which comprises
the sum of two opposing effects: on the one hand, increased offshoring implies a direct
export and thus loss of domestic jobs to a foreign country, which we term relocation
effect. This negative effect on domestic labor becomes smaller when moving from higher
to lower of levels of z˜, which means that the relocation effect is all the more larger the
lower the initial degree of offshoring. In absolute terms, the relocation effect is smaller
the larger the difference between reservation and foreign wage rate for given unit labor
requirement function γ(z). On the other hand, increased offshoring may come with an
output expanding effect as falling transportation costs lead to a decrease in marginal
production costs for each offshored intermediate good, which reduces prices and thus
induces more demand for final goods. Higher product demand in turn creates domestic
labor demand for the remaining in-house production, which we term profitability effect.
This effect is larger the higher the elasticity of substitution between varieties. With regard
to the initial degree of offshoring, we find a u-shaped relationship between the profitability
effect and z˜ because the magnitude of the profitability effect equals zero at the extreme
limits of z ∈ [0, 1] for given σ. This is because the output effect is larger the higher the
initial degree of offshoring (or equally the smaller the initial value of z˜) but higher degrees
of offshoring imply a relatively small amount of workers remaining in domestic production,
which limits the scope that this effect has on domestic labor demand. Conversely, if the
initial degree of offshoring is relatively low, relatively high numbers of domestic workers
are still involved in the production of intermediate goods, but then the output effect (that
could have an effect on these workers) would be relatively low.
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We can depict equation (1.28) graphically under application of γ(z) = z which yields:
dL
dt
= A
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
c−σ
 z˜
(ω − w∗) − σ
(1− z˜) (z˜)2
w∗ +
(
2z˜ − (z˜)2
)
(ω − w∗)
 . (1.29)
The first term in the bracket of expression (1.29) stands for the relocation and the second
term for the profitability effect. If one effect dominated the other for all initial values of z˜,
we would have an unambiguous algebraic sign. We can show, however, that this must not
necessarily be the case for certain values that are in line with the internal requirements
of our framework as can be seen in Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6: Total change of domestic labor demand
The initial values of z˜ marked by the red bars in Figure 1.6 show the bandwith(s) where the
relocation effect dominates over the profitability effect which leads to a net fall in domestic
labor demand in response to a fall in t. This is the case for offshoring levels at the extreme
ends for all possible values of z˜. Analogously, the profitability effect is larger compared
to the relocation effect for intermediate initial values of z˜, depicted by the green bar in
Figure 1.6 with the result that total domestic labor demand increases with falling t. It is
noteworthy that the absolute magnitude of the overall effect on domestic labor seems to
be tilted towards lower initial degrees of z˜ which is due to expression A
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
c−σ before
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the bracket in (1.29), which decreases in z˜. Figure 1.6 thus implies the following labor
development for a closed country that starts to introduce offshoring with falling t: the
country would first experience a fall in domestic labor, but the magnitude of this decline in
domestic labor would be relatively small. With ongoing offshoring activities, the country
experiences an increase in domestic labor demand as the profitability effect starts to take
effect and even more so until a low threshold value z˜ is reached, where the overall effect on
domestic labor turns back to negativity with high magnitude. It is also straightforward
to check that an exogenous increase in the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ
widens the scope of the domination of the profitability effect over the relocation effect for
initial values of z˜, which raises the probability of a country experiencing an increase in
domestic labor demand with increased market integration, as illustrated in Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7: Effect of an increase in σ on the total change of domestic labor demand
This leads us to our next proposition:
Proposition 4 Domestic labor demand may rise or fall in response to increased off-
shoring depending on the initial value of z˜: the relocation effect and thus negative impact
on domestic labor is likely to dominate over the profitability effect for relatively low and
high initial values of z˜ when confronted with a fall in t. The profitability effect and thus
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positive impact on domestic labor is likely to dominate over the relocation effect if the
degree of initial offshoring is neither too low or too high.
Given the two previous propositions, we can assert the following conclusion for the sit-
uation of the union when being confronted with a fall in trade costs: an increase in the
wage rate is always accompanied by a fall in domestic labor for relatively low and high
values. This effect is largest (both on wages and employment) when the initial degree of
offshoring is very advanced. However, comparison of figures 1.5 and 1.6 reveals a band-
with of intermediate initial degrees of offshoring where the union can benefit from both,
higher wages and more employment.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a model of offshoring and trade unions under heterogenous
labor. Our results show that increased market integration leads to more offshoring. With
regard to labor, increased offshoring leads to an increase of wages for both low- and
high-skilled workers. The former occurs because union workers demand higher wages
to compensate for the loss in domestic employment. High-skilled workers or managers
gain from offshoring as it enables firms to become more profitable. Which wage type
experiences a higher increase depends on the initial degree of offshoring: the relative wage
between low- and high-skilled workers is likely to decrease with relatively low or high initial
degrees of offshoring and is likely to increase if the initial degree of offshoring neither too
high or too low. Empirical studies on this subject will hopefully shed further light on the
ambiguities that remain with the underlying model. We are aware of only one empirical
study by Braun and Scheffel (2007) that analyzes the effect of outsourcing on union
wages.15 Further theoretical work should contain the relaxation of some of the restrictive
assumptions that were undertaken for the sake of simplicity and tractability in our model.
In particular, this concerns the restrictive assumption of fixed entry and exit of firms in the
differentiated goods sector. Furthermore, endogenization of the reservation wage would
15Note that these empirical findings need to be handled with care when comparing them with our
theoretical results as Braun and Scheffel make no explicit statement regarding the complementary and/or
substitutional character of the outsourcing activities captured in their available data.
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permit more interaction between both sectors considered in the model. In summary, the
issue of offshoring in the presence of trade unions and heterogenous labor remains to be
an ongoing important topic in the minds of concerned people. Further research on this
issue seems to be required to establish well-grounded policy recommendations in order to
rise to the challenges of an integrated global economy.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Labor Taxes on
Unionized Labor Markets in the
Presence of Offshoring
2.1 Introduction
Developed countries are generally characterized by relatively high tax ratios. This applies
in particular to European countries, whose overall tax ratio (as sum of taxes and social
security contributions) added up to 38,4% in the GDP-weighted average of the 27 EU
member states, compared to 26,9% in Japan and 24,8% in the USA.1 The persistent
high tax burden on labor is often believed to be a main source for high unemployment
in these countries. A popular idea in the fiscal policy debate concerns the reduction of
labor taxes in the hope that lower labor costs induce higher labor demand. Theoretical
contributions with regard to progressivity-neutral labor taxes seem to support this view,
(see for example Lockwood and Manning (1993) or Muysken et. al (1999)), yet the
1A number of countries undertook structural tax reforms to reduce the overall tax burden at the
beginning of the millenium, which caused the unweighted personal income tax average of OECD countries
to fall from 67% in 1981 to 49% in 1994 and 43% in 2006. This trend, however, seems to have petered out
with the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 (see the Appendix for a graph depicting the long-term
trend in the overall tax ratio in % of GDP for the EU). For more detailed information see Johansson et
al. (2008) and European Commission (2012).
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empirical evidence is not as clear-cut.2 The problem of high unemployment in a world
with growing globalization pressure induces the additional fear in developed countries,
that offshoring (as a means of relocating labor-intensive parts of the production from
high-wage to low-wage countries) leads to a crowding-out of domestic jobs by foreign
jobs.3 Given the fact that substantial numbers of workers in developed countries are
covered by collective bargaining agreements, a relevant question arises regarding the role
that trade unions play in this situation: What impact do trade unions have on labor
market outcomes and firms’ organizational choices in the presence of offshoring? And
how can policy-makers use this knowledge to optimize their fiscal policy strategies?
This paper aims to answer these questions in order to shed further light on the impact of
labor taxation on the domestic wage bargaining outcome in the presence of offshoring. The
specific focus of our analysis is motivated by the following observations: First, most models
on labor taxation and trade unions are restricted to an autartic view, thus blending out
global developments (e.g. Hersoug (1984), Sampson (1986), Palokangas (1987), Aronsson
and Sjögren (2004)). Markets, however, are often dominated by multinational firms that
take advantage of wage differences by offshoring production to lower-wage countries. This
has strong implications for the domestic wage bargaining outcome, which is left blended
out under autarky, as offshoring leads to a change in the wage elasticity of labor demand,
which should be taken into account by tax policy-makers. We pick up on this by allowing
for offshoring within our framework. Second, the majority of literature that considers
wage bargaining on a global scale (irrespective of labor taxation) restricts the analysis to
final goods, which implies some degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign
workers. Given this situation, there exists a broad consensus on the idea that the fear of
(actual or potential) job losses leads to wage moderation on behalf of trade unions and
thus an increase in the wage elasticity of labor demand on the domestic labor market (e.g.
2Layard and Nickel (1997), for example, find only a small significant effect regarding the relationship
between the overall tax burden und unemployment, based on cross-section regressions for 20 OECD
countries.
3Following authors such as Yeaple (2006), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodríguez-Clare
(2010), we understand offshoring as the movement of the production of inputs (or intermediate goods
and services) to a foreign country with the intention of reimporting them back to the home country.
This can occur within the firm (= vertical FDI) or through arms-length transactions (= international
outsourcing). Note that the terms vertical FDI and international outsourcing can be used interchangeably
in the context of our model if the offshored activities are complementary in their nature.
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Zhao (1998), Eckel and Egger (2009)). Our contribution challenges this line of reasoning
since offshoring is only attributed to the extent of intermediate goods/inputs. This results
in the slight but distinctive difference that domestic and foreign workers find themselves
in a complementary relationship which leads to a decrease in the wage elasticity of labor
demand as offshoring exogenizes a larger share of marginal production costs. As the wage-
employment tradeoff turns more favorable with less elastic labor demand, the trade union
compensates the loss of employment caused by offshoring with higher wage demands.4 It
is the complementary nature of intermediate goods that enables trade unions to enforce
higher wages based on their ability to blockade the whole production chain by refusing to
produce the required intermediate input that is still in ’domestic hands’ (see, for example,
Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Lommerud et al. (2009)).5
Based on these notions, we consider a single representative firm in a small open economy
that has the opportunity to relocate the production of required intermediate inputs to a
lower-wage foreign country. The domestic workers employed by the firm are represented
by a monoply trade union and pay personal income tax (henceforth wage or labor tax) on
their earnings that is collected by the government. The focus of our analysis is directed
towards wages and employment in the high-wage domestic country, thus blending out
the low-wage foreign country as an exogenous factor. Given this setup, we investigate
how the trade union alters its wage-setting behavior in response to changes in offshoring
opportunities and to changes in the marginal tax parameter.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no theoretical framework that considers the
implications of offshoring within a labor tax and wage bargaining framework. The clos-
est contribution to our agenda is given by Koskela and Schöb (2010) who analyze how
outsourcing and labor tax reforms affect the wage setting behavior of trade unions. They
show that outsourcing of final goods leads trade unions to moderate their wage claims
and that further tax progression can be beneficial for employment (an issue that is not
4See Lommerud et al. (2009), p. 112.
5Skaksen and Sørensen (2001) were one of the first contributors to point to the possibility that workers
may demand higher wages as compensation for employment losses if there exists a suffcient high degree
of complementarity between home and host country activities. Lommerud et al. (2009) also build their
analysis regarding the effect of deunionization on international outsourcing on this finding. The different
terms used by these authors, FDI with high degree of complementarity and international outsourcing,
can be summarized under our definition of offshoring.
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adressed in this paper). Furthermore, they find that falling outsourcing costs lead to an
increase in domestic employment as long as the share of outsourced workers is not too
large.
Building on a simple proportional tax modeling approach and adapting it to offshoring,
our analysis reveals the following results: first, the relationship between taxation and
domestic labor demand is negative, meaning that an increase in the marginal tax rate
reduces domestic labor. This is because an increase of the marginal labor tax rate leads
the union to demand higher wages. These higher wages create an incentive for offshoring,
which in turn leads to even higher wage demands by the union to compensate for the loss
of domestic employment. Second, when the considered economy is confronted with falling
transportation costs, the total effect on domestic labor crucially depends on the initial
degree of labor taxation. In this context, a negative effect on domestic labor is more
likely the lower the marginal tax rate and the lower the initial degree of offshoring. The
government can dampen this negative on domestic labor induced by a fall in transportation
costs, by raising the marginal tax rate. If the tax rate is sufficiently high, increased
offshoring may even induce a raise in domestic labor demand, depending on the initial
degree of offshoring.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we introduce the basic structure of
the model in Section 2 and solve for equilibrium in Section 3. We then go to on to analyze
the effect of increased market integration on the domestic labor market with focus on tax
policy implications. Finally, concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
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2.2 The Basic Model
2.2.1 Profits and Allocation of Production
Let us consider a market for a homogoneous final good in a high-wage industrialized
country that is characterized by a monopolistic firm and inverse linear demand
p = a− βy (2.1)
where p denotes product price and y total output. The firm operates in a fragmented
manufacturing sector that is small compared to the rest of the economy. Following Feen-
stra and Hanson (1996, 1997), final good y is assembled from a continuum of intermediate
goods that are indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each intermediate good x(z) is produced with a
linear-homogenous technology that requires labor as the only production factor. In addi-
tion, each unit of x(z) comes with a unit labor requirement γ(z) that increases linearly
with z. The production function can be written as
y = min
(
L(z)
γ(z)
)
∀ z ∈ [0, 1] (2.2)
where L(z) stands for total usage of labor in x(z). In terms of offshoring, the firm has the
possibility as well an incentive to relocate the production of labor-intensive intermediate
goods to a low-wage foreign country. The corresponding per unit cost function is given
by
c(w,w∗, t, z˜) = w
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz + w∗
∫ 1
z˜
γ(z)dz + (1− z˜)t (2.3)
where w∗ stands for the exogenous foreign competitive wage rate, t for the per unit trans-
portation cost that applies to all offshored intermediates and where z˜ marks the cut-off
point at which the firm is indifferent between producing x(z˜) at home or in a foreign
country.6
6To accommodate the assumption that foreign country is a low-wage country we assume that b > w∗
where b denotes unemployment benefits as fall-back position of unionized workers. For more details, see
Section 2.2.2 .
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Given equations (2.2) and (2.3), the firm’s profit equals
pi = (a− βy)y − c(w,w∗, t, z˜)y (2.4)
with ∂pi
∂y
= a− 2βy − c(w,w∗, t, z˜) and ∂pi
∂c
= −y.
Concerning the allocation of production it is straightforward to check that the extent of
offshoring depends on unit labor requirement γ(z), given factor prices and transportation
costs.7 All intermediates in the range [0, z˜) are produced at home in a high-wage country
whereas all intermediates in the range (z˜, 1] are produced abroad in a low-wage country.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.1 where linearity is assumed for simplicity.
Figure 2.1: Optimal offshoring decision of the firm
7Intermediate goods with relatively high values of z indicate labor-intensive production and thus
high values of unit labor requirement γ(z). In this case, the low-wage country possesses a cost advantage
whereas the high-wage country can produce intermediate goods at a lower cost for relatively low values
of z.
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2.2.2 Labor Taxation and Union Utility
The government is assumed to employ a proportional labor tax τ which is levied on the
union wage rate w with 0 < τ < 1. The net-of-tax wage that the domestic worker receives
can be expressed by
wn = (1− τ)w. (2.5)
We further assume that the objective of the monopoly union is represented by the rent
maximization function
Ω = (wn − b)
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz (2.6)
with domestic labor demand defined as
L =
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz = y
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz (2.7)
where b denotes exogenous unemployment benefits which constitute an outside-option for
unionized workers.8 Note that wn > b constitutes a necessary condition for Ω > 0.
2.3 Solving for Equilibrium
Given the basic model, we consider a sequence of contract periods where each contract
period consists of a four-stage game:
Stage 1: The government fixes labor tax parameter τ .
Stage 2: The firm determines the extent of offshoring: z˜.
Stage 3: The monopoly union sets the domestic wage rate w.
Stage 4: The firm determines output and employment.
8Instead of unemployment benefits one could also think of a reservation wage which can be obtained
in another economic sector with a competitive labor market structure.
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The assumption that the union’s wage setting decision is made after the firm has made
its offshoring decision is based on the notion that a firm’s organizational structure can
be interpreted as a long-term commitment. This long-term view of offshoring enables the
firm to anticipate how its offshoring decision will affect stages 3 and 4.9 To find a solution
for our proposed sequence of decision making, we solve the model through backwards
induction.
2.3.1 Optimal Output and Employment
In stage 4, the firm determines output and employment to maximize profits for a given
level of tax parameters, offshoring z˜ and domestic wage rate w. The first order condition
from equation (3.2) yields
y = 12β (a− c(w,w
∗, t, z˜)) , (2.8)
which leads to the firm’s optimal profits:
pi = βy2 = 14β (a− c(w,w
∗, t, z˜))2 . (2.9)
Substituting equation (2.8) into (2.7) gives the profit-maximizing domestic labor demand
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz = y
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz = 12β (a− c(w,w
∗, t, z˜))
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz. (2.10)
The corresponding wage elasticity of labor demand is given by:
η ≡ −∂
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
∂w
w∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
= w
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
a− c(w,w∗, t, z˜) . (2.11)
9The interpretation of offshoring as a long-term commitment is common but not universial in the wage
bargaining literature. Koskela (2010), for example, analyzes a reversed sequence of events for the case
of outsourcing, termed flexible outsourcing, where the firm can decide upon the amount of outsourcing
activity after the domestic wage has been set by the trade union. The same distinction can be found
in Koskela and Schöb (2010), who distinguish between long-term ‘strategic’ and short-term ‘flexible’
outsourcing. The qualitative results, however, do not change when considering a different sequential
arrangement, just in quantitative terms.
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2.3.2 Wage Setting Behavior of the Union
The monopoly union possesses all bargaining power and is therefore able to set the do-
mestic wage rate unilaterally according to its utility maximization scheme, while taking
the labor tax parameters and the offshoring amount z˜ as given and anticipating the con-
sequences of its wage setting decision on the firm’s labor demand (the outcome of stage
4). Accordingly, the gross union wage rate in stage 3 is determined by
w = arg max
w
{
Ω = (wn − b)
∫ z˜
0
L (z) dz
}
(2.12)
subject to the firm’s profit-maximizing labor demand (see equation 2.10 in Section 2.3.1).
This implies that in equilibrium wages will be set such that a percentage increase in
the union’s utility due to an increase in w is equal to the elasticity of the firm’s labor
demand. Solving the maximization problem yields the optimal domestic union wage for
a given level of z˜:10
w =
(1− τ)
(
a− w∗ ∫ 1z˜ γ (z) dz − (1− z˜) t)+ b ∫ z˜0 γ (z) dz
2 (1− τ) ∫ z˜0 γ (z) dz . (2.13)
Note that in case of disagreement the union has an outside option by going on strike
and receiving unemployment benefit b, whereas the firm has no conflict payoff due to the
complementary nature of the production process: a strike puts an end to the production of
intermediate inputs in its respective home country, which are unconditionally necessary for
the assembly of final good y.11 This has the consequence that the trade union maintains
or even strenghtens its bargaining power under offshoring (as the firm has more to lose
because offshoring enables it to become more profitable) resulting in higher wage demands
to compensate the loss of domestic employment (formal prove for this assertion will be
given in Section 2.3.3).
10See the Appendix.
11The firm could still produce all offshored intermediates in a foreign country, but could not make use
of them without the domestic counterpart so that the production of final good y would amount to zero.
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This implication differs greatly from models that include horizontal FDI or outsourcing
of final goods as in Koskela and Schöb (2010). In this case the firm can produce output
even in the event of a strike in the firm’s home country by redirecting the production of
entire goods abroad, thus strenghtening the bargaining position of the firm which results
in wage moderation on behalf on the union. It is important to be aware that we have the
exact opposite wage effect in our model.
2.3.3 Offshoring Decision of the Firm
In this section, we determine the optimal offshoring amount of the firm. Total differenti-
ation of the profit function in equation (2.9) with respect to z˜ yields
dpi
dz˜
= −y
(
∂c
∂z˜
+ ∂c
∂w
∂w
∂z˜
)
!= 0
from which follows that profit-maximization with respect to z˜ is fulfilled when
b
1− τ γ (z˜) = w
∗γ (z˜) + t. (2.14)
Under this condition the firm is indifferent between producing z˜ at home or in a foreign
country, which is the formal equivalent to the intersection point in Figure 2.1. Note that
an internal solution requires b1−τ > w
∗, which we assume to be satisfied, otherwise the
firm would have no incentive for offshoring. At first glance it may seem surprising that
the firm’s optimal offshoring decision does not depend on in-house production cost w but
rather on b1−τ , which we may call the after-tax unemployment benefit of domestic workers.
The reason for this is that the profitability of offshoring depends on the total available
rents that the monopoly union can extract from the firm. Using equation (2.14) we can
determine the union’s optimal wage response to offshoring:
dw
dz˜
=
(
b
1−τ − w
)
γ (z˜)∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
< 0 (2.15)
where an internal solution requires wn − b > 0, which implies w > b1−τ .
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As long as some production of intermediate goods remains in the home-country, the
monopoly union is able to extract higher wages under increased offshoring (which corre-
sponds to a fall in z˜) for the remaining employed workers in home country. This mecha-
nism is driven by the fact that offshoring decreases the wage elasticity of labor demand,
∂η
∂z˜
> 0, as it leads wage increases to have a smaller effect on marginal production costs
and therefore also on domestic employment. The implication from expression (2.15) can
easily be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Offshoring increases the domestic union wage rate.
Based on this finding we continue our comparative static analysis with regard to changes
in offshoring opportunities and changes in tax policy.
2.3.4 Labor Taxation of the Government
Let us now consider stage 1 of our proposed sequence of decision making, where the
government fixes labor tax parameters τ , to analyze their impact on the domestic labor
market. Note that we do not consider a fully balanced government budget owing to the
partial equilibrium nature of our analysis, as some sectors may engage in offshoring, but
not the whole economy.
Changes in labor tax policy directly affect the wage setting behavior of the monopoly union
and thus indirectly affect the offshoring decision of the firm as well. Based on the optimal
wage setting behavior of the monopoly union in equation (2.13), it is straightforward to
calculate the direct effect of a change in τ on the union wage rate w:
∂w
∂τ
= b
2 (1− τ)2 > 0. (2.16)
Hence an increase in the marginal labor tax rate results in higher wage demands of the
union. The corresponding total effect is given by:
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dw
dτ
=
+
∂w
∂τ
+
−
dw
dz˜
−
dz˜
dτ
(2.17)
= b
2 (1− τ)2 −
(
b
1−τ − w
)
γ (z˜)∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
bγ (z˜)(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
(1− τ)2 γ′ (z˜) > 0.
From expression (2.17) we can see that the direct effect of a change in τ on the union
wage rate is even reinforced by the indirect effect as firms adapt their optimal offshoring
decision to the forgone change of the union wage rate. Take for example an increase of
the marginal labor tax rate, which leads the monopoly union to demand higher wages.
Higher wages create an incentive for offshoring by the firm which in turn leads to even
higher wage demands by the union to compensate for the loss of domestic employment.
This reinforcement effect due to a rise in τ is the result of the assumed complementary
relationship between intermediate goods and therefore does not exist in labor taxation
models with horizontal FDI and/or outsourcing, where the indirect effect results in wage
moderation rather than wage augmentation.
Based on this knowledge we can now calculate the total effect of a change in τ on domestic
labor demand:
d
dτ
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz = yγ (z˜)
−
dz˜
dτ
+
−
dy
dτ
∫ z˜
0
γ (z) dz (2.18)
= −y b (γ (z˜))
2(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
(1− τ)2 γ′ (z˜) −
b
4β (1− τ)2
(∫ z˜
0
γ (z) dz
)2
< 0.
Given (2.18), we can unambiguously sign the total employment effect of a change in τ : an
increase will result in a decline of domestic labor demand for given parameters and vice
versa. This finding can be attributed to the aforementioned reinforcement effect regarding
the wage setting behavior of the union. Marginal labor tax increases (decreases) have a
positive (negative) impact on union wage claims and this wage effect is reinforced as firms
adapt their offshoring decision to the change of the wage rate, which can then be directly
linked to labor demand.
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Proposition 6 An increase in the marginal labor tax rate leads unambiguously to a de-
crease in domestic employment in the presence of offshoring.
2.4 Impact of Labor Taxation and Increased Market
Integration on Labor Market Outcomes
In this section we want to analyze how wages and employment in home country are affected
when offshoring opportunities improve, for example due to a fall in transportation costs,
as a synonym for increased market integration. Total differentiation of equation (2.14)
shows that lower transportation costs lead to an expansion of offshoring:
dz˜
dt
= 1(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
γ′ (z˜)
> 0 (2.19)
with γ′ (z˜) > 0 which can be derived from second-order-condition d2pi
dz˜2 . The result that a
fall in t leads to more offshoring is intuitively comprehensible as falling transportation costs
reduce the unit cost for every offshored intermediate good in foreign country. Graphically,
this corresponds to a downward shift of the w∗γ(z) + t curve in Figure 2.2 where the new
intersection of curves depicts a lower value of z˜.
Given (2.15) and (2.19) we can determine the total effect of a change in t on the union
wage rate:
dw
dt
=
−
∂w
∂t
+
−
dw
dz˜
+
dz˜
dt
= −
1
2 (1− z˜)∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
+
(
b
1−τ − w
)
γ (z˜)∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
1(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
γ′ (z˜)
< 0. (2.20)
The economic mechanism at work in (2.20) is the same as stated in Proposition 1 where
a fall in transportation costs simply acts as a factor that triggers a change in z˜ which
leads the monopoly union to raise wage demands to compensate for the loss in domestic
employment due to increased offshoring.
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Figure 2.2: Effect of falling transportation costs on the optimal offshoring decision of the
firm
The corresponding total effect on output due to a fall in t is given by:
dy
dt
= − 12β

+
∂c
∂t
+
+
∂c
∂z˜
+
dz˜
dt
+
+
∂c
∂w
−
dw
dt
 = − 14β (1− z˜) < 0. (2.21)
We can see from expression (2.21) that falling transportation costs lead to an overall
improvement of the cost situation for the firm, which leads to lower prices and thus
to more demand and output. The first and second term in the brackets correspond to
a reduction in costs by means of a direct and indirect channel, the latter leading to
an optimal reallocation of the production structure in terms of offshoring. Both cost
reducing effects counteract and exceed the third term in the brackets, a cost increasing
effect attributed to higher wage demands of the monopoly union as described in (2.20).
The magnitude of (2.21), which we henceforth term output expanding effect, depends on
the slope of the inverse demand function β as an indicator for market size and the initial
degree of z˜. Specifically, this effect is larger when β and z˜ are smaller: a smaller value of β
stands for a larger market size, where product demand is more elastic, whereas a smaller
initial value of z˜ dampens the wage augmenting effect of the union, as smaller values of z˜
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are associated with less labor intensive intermediate goods and thus less replacement of
domestic workers with foreign workers.12
Continuing our analysis, we learn from (2.21) that
dpi
dt
= 2βy
−
dy
dt
= −12 (1− z˜) y < 0, (2.22)
meaning that the overall profits of the firm also rise when transportation costs fall. Since
the monopoly union holds all bargaining power it is coherent that a rise in profits also
beneficial to the union’s utility:
dΩ
dt
= (b− wn)
(
1
4β (1− z˜)
∫ z˜
0
γ(z)dz + yγ (z˜)
)
< 0 (2.23)
for given labor tax parameter τ .
In the next step we are interested in how falling transportation costs (and thusa higher
degree of offshoring) affect domestic labor demand. The overall effect on domestic labor
appears not to be clear-cut as it consists of the sum of two opposing effects:
d
dt
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
yγ (z˜) dz˜
dt
+
−︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ z˜
0
γ (z) dz dy
dt
(2.24)
= y γ (z˜)(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
γ′ (z˜)
− 14β (1− z˜)
∫ z˜
0
γ (z) dz ≶ 0.
The first term corresponds to the direct loss of domestic employment as a result of in-
creased offshoring, whereas the second term is an indirect effect that applies to the afore-
mentioned output expansion in (2.21), which results in a positive effect on domestic em-
ployment. Which effect dominates the other depends predominantly on the initial degree
of τ and z˜. To understand this and to keep the model tractable, let us assume a spe-
12Recall that the monopoly union demands higher wages to compensate for the loss in domestic
employment caused by offshoring.
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cific function for γ (z) that contains the assumption that unit labor requirement increases
linearly with z, for simplicity γ (z) = z. Function (2.24) then takes the form
d
dt
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz = 18β

+︷ ︸︸ ︷
z˜
(
2a− w∗ (z˜ − 1)2
)
− b1−τ (2− z˜) z˜
b
1−τ − w∗
−
+
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(z˜ − 1) (z˜)2
 . (2.25)
The first insight we can gain from (2.25) is that the change in total labor demand in
response to a fall in transportation costs does not depend on β (and thus market size).
Second, the first term in the brackets of (2.25) stands for the aforementioned direct loss
of domestic jobs to foreign country in light of falling transportation costs. This effect is
illustrated in Figure 2.3, from which we can infer that the negative substitution effect on
domestic labor becomes smaller with lower initial values of z˜ (and thus higher degree of
offshoring) as well as higher levels of τ .13 The linearity of the depicted function(s) can
be attributed to our assumption that labor intensity decreases linearly with offshoring.
Furthermore, higher levels of taxation induce a lower negative effect on domestic labor
for all initial values of z˜ because a higher value of τ is detrimental to both output and
the effect of a change in falling transportation costs on offshoring dz˜
dt
.14
Third, turning to the second term in the brackets of (2.25), we can see that it implies a
u-shaped relationship with regard to the indirect labor demand effect of further offshoring
and the initial degree of offshoring z˜ in light of falling transportation costs, as depicted
in Figure 2.4. This is because the product
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz dydt for given β equals zero at the
extreme limits of z ∈ [0, 1], as both terms counteract each other with respect to the initial
degree of z˜: recall from equation (2.21) that the magnitude of the output expanding effect
dy
dt
is larger the smaller the initial value of z˜ (or alternatively the higher the initial degree
of offshoring). This means, however, that relatively few domestic workers are involved in
the overall production process, measured by the term
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz, which limits the scope
13Note that all chosen numerical values in our figures fulfill the internal requirements of the model,
namely y > 0 and w > b1−τ > w∗.
14Recall from equation (2.19) that the effect of a change in transportation costs on the degree of
offshoring is smaller the larger the wage differences between the home country and foreign country for a
given tax rate and given labor intensities. An increase in the tax rate, ceteris paribus, enforces this effect.
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Figure 2.3: Negative effect on domestic labor due to falling trade costs
of the output expanding effect to induce more employment for these workers as offshoring
increases even further. The same line of argumentation can be applied to relatively high
inital values of z˜, where the scope of the output expanding effect is very high, but the
actual magnitude of the output expanding effect very low.
Figure 2.4: Positive effect on domestic labor due to falling trade costs
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Now that we have discussed the two opposing effects on domestic labor demand in response
to a fall in transportation costs, we can combine these two effects to determine conditions
under which the total effect on domestic labor demand is positive and/or negative. It has
become apparent from Figure 2.3, that the level of taxation plays an important role to
determine the algebraic sign of (2.24).
Differentiation of (2.25) with respect to τ yields
d2
dtdτ
∫ z˜
0
L(z)dz =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
z˜(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
−︷︸︸︷
dy
dτ
+
+/−︷ ︸︸ ︷
8yβ (1− τ) + (b− w∗ (1− τ)) (3z˜ − 2) z˜
8β (b− w∗ (1− τ))
−︷︸︸︷
dz˜
dτ
= bz˜ (b− w
∗ (1− τ)) (4− 5z˜) z˜ − (1− τ) (2a− w∗)
8β (1− τ) (b− w∗ (1− τ))2 ≶ 0. (2.26)
Figure 2.5 depicts equation (2.26) on a three-dimensional scale depending on τ and z˜. It is
straightforward to check that d2
dtdτ
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz is negative for most combinations of τ and z˜,
especially when z˜ becomes relatively high, but less so with increasing τ , because a higher
tax rate decreases the magnitude of dz˜
dt
and therefore negative impact on domestic labor
demand in the light of falling transportation costs. Moreover, if the tax rate is relatively
high, d2
dtdτ
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz can turn both positive and negative depending on the initial degree
of offshoring.
Proposition 7 A negative effect on domestic labor associated with increased offshoring
is more likely the lower the marginal tax rate and the lower the initial degree of offshoring.
A government can cushion this negative effect on domestic labor by raising the marginal
tax rate. If the tax rate is sufficiently high, increased offshoring may even induce a raise
in domestic labor demand, depending on the initial degree of offshoring.
Our result that higher taxation can be benefical to domestic employment stands in con-
strast to our finding in Section 2.3.4, where we asserted a negative relationship between
taxes and employment. This apparent contradiction is put into perspective when we recall
that the tax-employment assertion of Proposition 3 essentially constitutes a best-response
reaction when the government is confronted with increased offshoring, triggered by a fall
in transportation costs, to ease the negative effect on domestic labor.
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Figure 2.5: Influence of taxation on the total change of domestic labor demand when
trade costs fall
This stands in contrast to a situation, where the government may choose to raise the
marginal tax rate for a given level of offshoring, thereby setting a mechanism in motion
that results in less domestic labor demand (higher taxes induce the trade union to demand
higher wages which creates an incentive for more offshoring which leads the union to
demand even higher wages).
Figure 2.6 depicts the situation where total domestic labor may increase or decline in
response to a change in t, based on the assumption that the marginal tax rate is sufficiently
high. The analytical solutions for those initial values of z˜′ where a fall in transportation
costs has no effect on domestic labor demand with d
dt
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz = 0 are given by:
z˜′1 = 0,
z˜′2 =
3
4 − 2
√√√√√
(
9b
1−τ − 16a− w∗
)
64
(
b
1−τ − w∗
) , (2.27)
z˜′3 = 2
√√√√√
(
9b
1−τ − 16a− w∗
)
64
(
b
1−τ − w∗
) + 34 ,
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where τ > 1 − 9b16a+w∗ constitutes a mathematical requirement, which translates into
a relatively high tax rate. Otherwise d
dt
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz is positive for all initial values z˜′.
Furthermore, to accomodate the assumption that z ∈ [0, 1], sufficient conditions a > 12w∗
and a > 12
(
b
1−τ
)
must be fulfilled for z˜′2 > 0 and z˜′3 < 1 as z˜′2 < z˜′3 in absolute terms.
Figure 2.6: Total change in domestic labor demand due to fall in trade costs for a suffi-
ciently high tax rate
Differentiation of d
dt
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz with respect to z˜ yields a maximum and minimum point at
z˜∗1 =
b− w∗ (1− τ)− 13
√
3
√
(b− w∗ (1− τ)) (3b− (1− τ) (4a+ w∗))
2 (b− w∗ (1− τ)) , (2.28)
z˜∗2 =
b− w∗ (1− τ) + 13
√
3
√
(b− w∗ (1− τ)) (3b− (1− τ) (4a+ w∗))
2 (b− w∗ (1− τ)) (2.29)
where the second order conditions are fulfilled as d
2
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
(z˜∗1) < 0 and
d2
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
(z˜∗2) >
0.15
15Proof can be found in the Appendix.
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Using equations (2.27) - (2.29), we find formal proof that z˜′1 < z˜∗1 < z˜′2 < z˜∗2 < z˜′3.
The distance between z˜′2 and z˜′3 represents the bandwith of initial values of z˜, where the
output expanding effect dominates over the negative substitution effect of labor. Thus if
the initial degree of offshoring lies between z˜′2 and z˜′3, a fall in transportation costs will
induce an increase in total labor demand. The reverse argumentation applies to all other
initial values of z˜. This result is interesting in the sense that this scenario allows for
several cut-off points that induce a change in total domestic labor demand. Other wage
bargaining models that analyze the impact of increased offshoring on domestic labor
demand usually feature only one cut-off point.16
Proposition 8 If product demand is elastic and the tax rate sufficiently high, total labor
demand will decrease for relatively high and low values of initial offshoring and increase
for these values of z˜ in between.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that exogenous changes in the parameters inherent in z˜′2
and z˜′3 lead to an overall widening or shrinking of the above-mentioned bandwith of initial
z˜ values:17
∂z˜′2
∂b
< 0, ∂z˜
′
2
∂w∗
> 0, ∂z˜
′
2
∂τ
< 0, (2.30)
∂z˜′3
∂b
> 0, ∂z˜
′
3
∂w∗
< 0, ∂z˜
′
3
∂τ
> 0.
We can summarize the implications of (2.30) in the following way: factors that decrease
the magnitude of the negative effect on domestic labor which corresponds to an increase
in b and τ or a decrease in w∗, lead to a widening of the bandwith of initial values of z˜ that
represents the domination of the output expanding effect over the negative substitution
effect of labor (assuming that the tax rate is sufficiently high to have an ambiguous effect
16Lommerud et. al (2009), for example, find that increased offshoring has a positive effect on labor
demand if the initial share of offshoring is relatively low, but this positive labor demand diminishes into
negativity with continued offshoring. It is also worth noting that they use the term outsourcing for the
relocation of production inputs to a foreign country in their model, which falls under our definition of
offshoring.
17See the Appendix.
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on total labor demand). The result is, ceteris paribus, an increase in the likeliness that a
fall in t will increase total domestic labor demand depending on initial value of z˜.
Our consideration of a unionized labor market that is affected by offshoring affirms the
general notion that a reduction in progressivity-neutral labor taxation has a positive
effect on employment. This effect is not so clearly unambiguous in models that include
horizontal FDI or outsourcing as labor taxation may lead to wage moderation in these
kind of models which is not the case in our framework.
2.5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the implications of improved offshoring opportunities and labor tax-
ation on wages and employment in a unionized labor market. The main results can be
summarized in the following way: First, offshoring leads trade unions to demand higher
wages as compensation for the loss in domestic employment. Second, an increase in the
marginal tax rate leads unambiguously to a decrease in labor demand. This is because
higher taxes bring about higher wage demands by the trade union and firms react to this
change by expanding their offshoring activities, which induces trade unions to demand
even higher wages. Third, falling transportation costs create an incentive for firms to
expand their offshoring activities. Offshoring may have a positive and negative effect on
domestic employment depending on the initial degree of offshoring and the tax rate. The
negative effect is the direct result of the offshoring-induced export of domestic jobs to the
foreign country, whereas a positive effect may occur due to an output expanding effect
as falling transportation costs improve the cost structure of the firm, which lowers prices
and thus increases product demand. If product demand is elastic and the tax rate suffi-
ciently high, labor demand is likely to decrease for relatively high and low values of initial
offshoring and likely to increase for initial offshoring values in between. Fourth, the gov-
ernment can counteract a potential negative labor demand effect when being confronted
with increased offshoring. On a more general level we can confirm that the consideration
of offshoring in a framework with unionized labor does not alter the general notion that
a reduction in progressivity-neutral labor taxation has a positive effect on employment.
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Appendix
Long-term trend in the overall tax ratio in % of GDP for the EU
Figure A.1: Long-term trend in the overall tax ratio (including social security contribu-
tions) in % of GDP for the EU
Note This figure is extracted from European Commission (2012). The statistical break is
due to the change from ESA79 to ESA95 (European system of national and regional
accounts).
Proof of maximum and minimum with regard to the total change
in domestic labor for a fall in transportation costs
The first and second derivatives of equation (2.25) with respect to z˜ are given by:
d
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
= 6z˜ (1− z˜) (b− w
∗ (1− τ))− (1− τ) (2a− w∗)
8β (b− w∗ (1− τ)) , (2.31)
d2
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
= 14β (6z˜ − 3) . (2.32)
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Inserting the critical points (2.28) and (2.29) where d
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
= 0 yields the second order
conditions for a maximum and minimum with:
d2
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
(z˜∗1) = −
√
3 (b− w∗ (1− τ)) (3b− (1− τ) (4a+ w∗))
4β (b− w∗ (1− τ)) < 0, (2.33)
d2
∫ z˜
0 L(z)dz
dtdz˜
(z˜∗2) =
√
3 (b− w∗ (1− τ)) (3b− (1− τ) (4a+ w∗))
4β (b− w∗ (1− τ)) > 0 (2.34)
with τ > 1− 3b(4a+w∗) as mathematical requirement.
Comparative static analysis
It is straightforward to obtain the effects of changes in a, τ , w∗, z˜, b and t on the optimal
union wage:
∂w
∂a
= 1
2
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
> 0,
∂w
∂τ
= b
2 (1− τ)2 > 0,
∂w
∂w∗
= γ (z˜)
2
∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
> 0,
∂w
∂b
= 12 (1− τ) > 0,
∂w
∂t
= −
1
2 (1− z˜)∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
< 0,
∂w
∂z˜
= (1− τ) (w
∗γ (z˜) + t) + bγ (z˜)− 2 (1− τ) γ (z˜)w
2 (1− τ) ∫ z˜0 γ (z) dz ≶ 0. (2.35)
All derivatives have the expected sign. The effect of z˜ on the optimal wage appears at
first glance ambiguous but can be determined when inserting the equilibrium condition
for optimal offshoring as given in (2.14):
dw
dz˜
=
(
b
1−τ − w
)
γ (z˜)∫ z˜
0 γ (z) dz
< 0 (2.36)
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as necessary condition requires w > b1−τ . Total differentiation of (2.14) yields:
dz˜
dt
= 1(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
γ′ (z˜)
> 0, (2.37)
dz˜
dτ
= − bγ (z˜)(
b
1−τ − w∗
)
(1− τ)2 γ′ (z˜) < 0. (2.38)
Furthermore, the cutoff points where a fall in transportation costs has no effect on total
domestic labor demand are given by
z˜′1 = 0,
z˜′2 =
3
4 − 2
√√√√√
(
9b
1−τ − 16a− w∗
)
64
(
b
1−τ − w∗
) , (2.39)
z˜′3 = 2
√√√√√
(
9b
1−τ − 16a− w∗
)
64
(
b
1−τ − w∗
) + 34 .
Differentiation of z˜′2 and z˜′3 with respect to b, w∗ and τ gives:
∂z˜′2
∂b
= −(1− τ)8∆
2a− ω
(b− ω (1− τ))2 < 0,
∂z˜′2
∂w∗
= (1− τ)8∆
2a (1− τ)− b
(b− ω (1− τ))2 > 0,
∂z˜′2
∂τ
= − b8∆
2a− ω
(b− ω (1− τ))2 < 0,
∂z˜′3
∂b
= (1− τ)8∆
2a− ω
(b− ω (1− τ))2 > 0,
∂z˜′3
∂w∗
= −(1− τ)8∆
2a (1− τ)− b
(b− ω (1− τ))2 < 0,
∂z˜′3
∂τ
= b8∆
2a− ω
(b− ω + τω)2 > 0, (2.40)
where ∆ ≡
√
( 9b1−τ−16a−w∗)
64( b1−τ−w∗)
.
Chapter 3
Pattern Bargaining and FDI
3.1 Introduction
Pattern bargaining has been a long-observed phenomenon since the aftermath of World
War II and refers to a wage negotiation practice that is used by industry-wide trade unions
to determine wages. The procedural method of pattern bargaining implies a sequential
course of action, where the union first chooses a target firm to negotiate a wage rate. This
outcome then serves as a pattern for all subsequent negotiations where, in a strict sense,
the union makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the remaining firms or where, in a more loose
sense, the agreed upon wage rate with the target firm serves as a precedent. When the
strict form of pattern bargaining applies and there is agreement among all participants
(enforced through strikes if necessary), uniform wage rates across firms are the result.
The economic reasoning as to why trade unions might prefer pattern bargaining over
other bargaining arrangements can be explained by the so-called ‘taking labor out of
competition’ argument: unionized firms in oligopolistic markets usually have an incentive
to bargain hard on wages, since lower wages constitute a competitive advantage over
market competitors. Pattern bargaining, however, takes the edge out of this incentive,
as wage concessions become more acceptable when all other firms agree to them as well,
which is in the interest of the union.
On an empirical level, pattern bargaining has been most notably a feature of U.S. col-
lective bargaining in oligopolistic industries such as automobiles, steel and aerospace,
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but can to some extent be observed in collective bargaining arrangements in Western
European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden as well.
In the case of Germany, for example, area-wide wage agreements (Flächentarifverträge)
constitute the counterpart to pattern bargaining in the aforementioned strict sense, wher-
eras company-wide collective wage agreements (Firmentarifverträge) or so-called ‘me too
agreements’ (where firms voluntarily agree to terms and wages negotiated by other firms)
can be counted to the more loose interpretation of pattern bargaining. Empirical research
suggests that pattern bargaining still plays a substantial role in unionized labor markets,
but that the phenomenon itself has experienced a declining trend in magnitude.1 Parallel
to this trend has been a tendency towards ‘organized decentralization’ in most Euro-
pean countries, leading to more collective agreements on a more decentralized level with
individual firms.2
Given the fact that pattern bargaining constitutes a long-observed ongoing phenomenon,
it is somewhat surprising that economic research on this topic is quite rare. The aim of
our paper is therefore to enrich this strand of literature by widening the point of view on
pattern bargaining in terms of horizontal FDI. Our framework builds on Dobson (1994)
and Marshall and Merlo (2004), which can be considered as the first basic research on
pattern bargaining with a concrete modeling approach. Dobson (1994) compares simulta-
neous to sequential wage bargaining scenarios in a model that includes an industry-wide
union and two firms competing in cournot fashion with each other. His findings suggest
that sequential bargaining leads to asymmetric wage rates caused by the differences in
the union’s disagreement payoff at each bargaining stage, where the bargaining power
is higher in the successive bargain. Marshall and Merlow (2004) expand this framework
by allowing for uniformity in wages (or alternatively in costs) across firms, which corre-
sponds to our understanding of pattern bargaining in the aforementioned ’strict sense’.
They show that pattern bargaining is preferred by the union over all other bargaining
scenarios, but simultaneously raise the question of why firms agree to pattern bargain-
ing in the first place, as each of the considered two firms prefer a different bargaining
environment compared to pattern bargaining. Creane and Davidson (2011) pick up on
1See, for example, Seltzer (1951), Levinson (1960), Freedman and Fulmer (1982) for empirical and
anecdotal evidence.
2See, for example, Traxler (1995), Sisson and Marginson (2002) and Ochel (2005).
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this issue by introducing uncertainty over productivity in their model to create instances
where both the union and firms prefer pattern bargaining over sequential bargaining.
What the three aforementioned papers have in common is that they take an autarkic
viewpoint only. To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one contribution by
Calmfors and Larsson (2011) that takes on a modeling approach with pattern bargaining
in a small open economy, yet their research question is focused on different monetary
regimes. The novelty of our paper lies in the introduction of FDI into a model of pattern
bargaining, thereby building on the idea that FDI endows firms with an outside option
in case wage negotiations fail, which strengthens their bargaining position. This effect
has been neglected in the pattern bargaining literature so far. Moreover, we distinguish
bargaining environments where the union may or may not be endowed with an outside
option in case wage negotiations fail. This serves the purpose of allowing implications to
be drawn regarding the influence of the degree of collective bargaining centralization on
labor market outcomes under pattern bargaining: the case of no outside option for the
union implies that the union has everything to lose or gain depending on the success of
wage negotiations. This wage bargaining arrangement could, for example, be enforced
by an employers’ association, so that this case implies a more centralized bargaining
environment like in the case of area-wide wage agreements in Germany. In contrast, a
positive outside option for the union can arise if the union can reach an agreement with
one firm even if wage negotiations fail with another. This corresponds to the case of a more
decentralized bargaining environment on the basis of firm-level collective wage agreements,
for example. Another important feature of our model is based on an assumed asymmetry
in firms’ capabilities to undertake FDI; namely, that firm 1 possesses the option of FDI
whereas firm 2 does not. This allows us to distinguish cases where the union might prefer
one or the other firm to take on the target role.
Our main findings are the following: First, FDI lowers the union’s wage rate compared to
the autarkic case under pattern bargaining. This is because FDI enables firms to produce
output from abroad when the union decides to go on strike in the firm’s domestic country,
which represents a credible threat and therefore better bargaining position during wage
negotiations. Second, we find that the union is always better off in a more decentralized
bargaining environment which allows for a positive conflict payoff. The economic reason
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for this result goes beyond the argument that a positive conflict payoff improves the
bargaining position of the union, because it alters the conflict payoff to the firm as well.
A positive conflict payoff to the union implies that a firm still remains active in the market
even when the wage negotiation with another firm fails. This other firm will consequently
produce output from abroad to serve the domestic market yet the corresponding conflict
payoff is now based on less market share, because the other domestic firm prevails in
the market. This mechanism that enhances the outside option of the union can offer an
explanation for the trend towards collective bargaining agreements on a more decentralized
level. Third, given the choice, the union prefers the domestic rather than the multinational
firm to be the target firm. This result can be attributed to the specific procedure that is
attributed to pattern bargaining. Recall that negotiations with the target firm result in a
wage rate that becomes mandatory for the entire industry. If the solely domestically active
firm takes on the role of the target firm, FDI finds no entrance into the wage negotiations
and the other multinational firm must accept the resulting wage rate without playing out
its FDI option. Last but not least, we find that pattern bargaining is more beneficial to
all participating firms if the multinational firm carries out the role of the target firm. This
effect is strengthened when the union possesses no conflict payoff.
The remainder of this paper is given as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the basic frame-
work of our model. In Section 3 we analyze different bargaining environments (namely
simultaneous and pattern bargaining) depending on different conflict payoffs to the union
under autarky. The fourth and final section builds upon the main part of our model with
the consideration of FDI under different pattern bargaining regimes. Concluding remarks
are offered in Section 5.
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3.2 Basic Model
In this section we introduce the basic model of our analysis which is a simplified version
of the Marshall and Merlo (2004) framework with similar notation and assumptions re-
garding functional forms.3 At the starting point we consider an industry where two firms
produce a homogenous good using the same technology which exhibits constant returns
to scale. The firms are exposed to Cournot competition with inverse linear demand given
by
pi (xi, xj) = a− xi − xj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j (3.1)
where a > 0. Labor is assumed to be the only factor of production with marginal product
of labor equalling one such that x1 = l1 and x2 = l2. All workers at each firm are
represented by the same industry-wide trade union so that the wage rate wi paid by
each firm is determined via bargaining in a right-to-manage manner, meaning that the
union wage rate is determined first with firms subsequently choosing output and thus
employment according to their profit-maximization scheme. The profit function of the
ith firm equals
pii = (a− xi − xj)xi − wili, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j (3.2)
from which we can deduct the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium result for output and
employment
xi(wi, wj) = li =
a+ wj − 2wi
3 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j (3.3)
as well for profits
pii(wi, wj) =
(a+ wj − 2wi)2
9 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (3.4)
Note that if firm i were to operate in the considered market as a monopolist, optimal
3We keep the model simple by abstracting from variables such as the degree of substitutability between
products and differences in firm efficiency in order to focus on the influence of FDI on market outcomes
in different bargaining environments.
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output and profit levels would amount to
xmi (wi) = lmi =
a− wi
2 , i = 1, 2 (3.5)
and
pimi (wi) =
1
4 (a− wi)
2 , i = 1, 2 (3.6)
for given wage rate wi. Turning our attention back to the industry-wide union, its utility
is characterized by the wage bill maximizing function
Ωu(w1, w2) = w1l1 (w1, w2) + w2l2 (w1, w2) . (3.7)
Using equations (3.4) and (3.5) we can go on to model the wage negotiation process
between the union and firm i in form of a Nash bargaining problem to find a Nash
solution to
w∗i = arg maxwi
[
Ωu(wi, w∗j )− di
]
·
[
pii(wi, w∗j )−Ψi
]
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j (3.8)
where w∗j represents the equilibrium wage rate paid by the other firm and where di and
Ψi denote the outside-option of the union and firm i, respectively. Positive outside-
options represent a fallback-position if negotiations fail and are therefore beneficial for
the bargaining position of the corresponding negotiation party.
In the next step we apply the Nash bargaining concept to different bargaining environ-
ments both under autarky and horizontal FDI, while considering different outside options
for the union and each firm. With regard to bargaining environments, we distinguish
between two cases where negotiations are conducted either (a) simultaneously or (b) in
sequence using the so-called ’pattern bargaining in wages’ approach, where the union bar-
gains over a wage rate with a target firm and the outcome of this first negotiation round
becomes binding to the remaining firm.4 Furthermore, with regard to outside option di,
4See Marshall and Merlo (2004).
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we adopt the idea expressed in Dobson (1994), that the union’s payoff in case of disagree-
ment depends on the structural wage bargaining arrangements within the industry. If, for
example, firms agree beforehand on a cooperative bargaining strategy such as to hold off
production until a wage agreement is reached for all firms, the disagreement payoff and
thus outside-option of the union equals di = 0. This scenario appears plausible in the
presence of an employers’ association in more centralized bargaining systems for example.
If wage bargaining takes place on a more decentralized level, the union might find a wage
agreement with a firm that is willing to produce output even in the event of disagreement
with the other firm, in which case the disagreement payoff to the union becomes positive
di > 0. With regard to the outside option of the firm(s), we allow for the distinction
betweeen autarky and FDI. The option of FDI enables firms to produce output abroad
to serve the considered market in the event of a domestic strike, which strengthens the
firms’ bargaining position such that Ψi > 0. This flexibility in production is not given
under autarky so that firms earn zero profits in case of disagreement implying Ψi = 0.
Note that we allow for an asymmetry in the firms’ ability to conduct FDI in our model,
thereby accomodating the empirical observation that some firms engage in international
activities and others do not.
3.3 Autarky
3.3.1 Simultaneous Bargaining without Outside Option (A)
The first bargaining environment to be considered concerns simultaneous bargaining as
a benchmark case where both firms bargain with the trade union simultaneously. We
additonally assume for this section that the conflict payoff to the union equals zero with
di = 0, which leaves the union with no outside-option. The equilibrium union wage rates
under this scenario are determined by solving the following system of equations:
wA
∗
1 = arg maxw1
[
Ωu(w1, wA
∗
2 )
]
·
[
pi1(w1, wA
∗
2 )
]
, (3.9)
wA
∗
2 = arg maxw2
[
Ωu(wA
∗
1 , w2)
]
·
[
pi2(wA
∗
1 , w2)
]
.
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which due to the simultaneous nature of the bargaining arrangement is based on the
anticipated equilibrium wage rate wA∗j with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The first-order condition
for (3.9) yields
wA
∗
1 =
1
16
(
5a+ 8wA∗2 −
√
3
√
32wA∗2 (a− wA∗2 ) + 3a2
)
(3.10)
and
wA
∗
2 =
1
16
(
5a+ 8wA∗1 −
√
3
√
32wA∗1 (a− wA∗1 ) + 3a2
)
(3.11)
for each firm respectively. By combining the first order conditions with each other and
keeping in mind that we can apply the symmetry assumption on the two firms, we obtain
the equilibrium wage rates as a function of the parameters in our model:
wA
∗
1 = wA
∗
2 =
1
10a. (3.12)
Inserting the equilibrium wage rates into (3.3) and (3.4) gives the equilibrium output and
profit levels:
xA
∗
1 = lA
∗
1 = xA
∗
2 = lA
∗
2 =
3
10a, (3.13)
piA
∗
1 = piA
∗
2 =
9
100a
2. (3.14)
Moreover we can obtain the equilibrium value for the utility of the union from (3.12) and
(3.13):
Ωu(wA
∗
1 , w
A∗
2 ) =
3
50a
2 (3.15)
3.3.2 Simultaneous Bargaining Based on Monopoly Levels (Am)
The bargaining environment in this section is closely related to Section 3.3.1, the only
difference being that we allow for a positive conflict payoff di > 0. In case of disagreement
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between the union and firm i, the conflict payoff to the union is assumed to equal the wage
bill that results when the other firm j remains in the market to operate as a monopolist
given the anticipated equilibrium wage rate wAm∗j with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Consequently,
we now solve for
wA
m∗
1 = arg maxw1
[
Ωu(w1, wA
m∗
2 )− wA
m∗
2 l
m
2
(
wA
m∗
2
)]
·
[
pi1(w1, wA
m∗
2 )
]
, (3.16)
wA
m∗
2 = arg maxw2
[
Ωu(wA
m∗
1 , w2)− wA
m∗
1 l
m
1
(
wA
m∗
1
)]
·
[
pi2(wA
m∗
1 , w2)
]
.
The corresponding first-order conditions are given by
wA
m∗
1 =
1
8
(
a+ 4wA
∗
m
2
)
(3.17)
and
wA
m∗
2 =
1
8
(
a+ 4wAm∗1
)
, (3.18)
from which we obtain the equilibrium wage rates:
wA
m∗
1 = wA
m∗
2 =
1
4a. (3.19)
The equilibrium output and profit levels equal
xA
m∗
1 = lA
m∗
1 = xA
m∗
2 = lA
m∗
2 =
1
4a, (3.20)
piA
m∗
1 = piA
m∗
2 =
1
16a
2. (3.21)
The utility of the union in equilibrium is given by
Ωu(wA
m∗
1 , w
Am∗
2 ) =
1
8a
2. (3.22)
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A quick comparison between bargaining environments A and Am reveals the intuitive
result that the trade union is better off when being endowed with a positive conflict
payoff di > 0: wages and consequently union utility are higher under Am, while firms face
lower profits under Am compared to A.
3.3.3 Pattern Bargaining without Outside Option (B)
This bargaining environment corresponds to the aforementioned situation where the union
chooses a target firm to negotiate a common wage rate for the whole industry, based on
the underlying assumption that the non-target firm accepts or commits to the wage rate
negotiated by the target firm in a take-it-or-leave manner. Under autarky, the symmetry
of the two firms ensures identical results under pattern bargaining independent of which
firm is selected as target firm. Thus we can determine the equilibrium values by solving
wB
∗
i = arg maxw [Ωu(w,w)] · [pii(w,w)] , (3.23)
wB
∗
j = wB
∗
i
with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. This yields
wB
∗
1 = wB
∗
2 =
1
4a (3.24)
as equilibrium wage rates under pattern bargaining without outside option. Plugging
(3.24) into (3.3) and (3.4) gives
xB
∗
1 = lB
∗
1 = xB
∗
2 = lB
∗
2 =
1
4a, (3.25)
piB
∗
1 = piB
∗
2 =
1
16a
2 (3.26)
for equilibrium output, employment and profits. Union utility in equilibrium amounts to
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Ωu(wB
∗
1 , w
B∗
2 ) =
1
8a
2. (3.27)
At this instance it is worthwhile to note that the results obtained in this section are
identical to those obtained from bargaining environment Am (simultaneous bargaining
based on monopoly levels), implying that the trade union is equally well off under pattern
bargaining even if no conflict payoff is granted compared to the situation of simultaneous
bargaining where a positive conflict payoff is part of the assumed bargaining environment.
Comparison of bargaining environments A and B, both cases with di = 0, reveals an
even more clear incentive for the union to prefer pattern bargaining over simultaneous
bargaining.
3.3.4 Pattern Bargaining Based on Monopoly Levels (Bm)
Similar to Section 3.3.2, we supplement bargaining environment B with a positive conflict
payoff to the union. This conflict payoff comes into play when disagreement springs
between the union and firm i during wage negotiations and builds on monopoly values
with regard to firm j. We can again neglect the question which firm is selected as target
firm as the assumed symmetry of the firms holds for this case as well. The equilibrium
wage rates are solutions to
wB
m∗
i = arg maxw
[
Ωu(w,w)− wm∗j lm∗j
(
wm∗j
)]
· [pii(w,w)] , (3.28)
wB
m∗
j = wB
m∗
i
with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Note that the outside option of the union in (3.28) is not based
on the anticipated equilibrium wage rate any more (as was the case with simultaneous
bargaining), but on wm∗j . This is the wage rate that applies if the union and firm i find
no agreement in the previous negotation round, resulting in a one-to-one wage bargaining
situation between the union and remaining firm j that takes the form
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wm∗j = arg maxwj
[
wjl
m
j (wj)
]
·
[
pimj (wj)
]
based on monopoly levels (3.5) and (3.6) with
wm∗j =
1
4a (3.29)
resulting in optimum. Solving expression (3.28) for equilibrium wage rates yields
wB
m∗
1 = wB
m∗
2 =
(
10− 3√2
)
16 a (3.30)
with equilibrium values for output and profit equalling
xB
m∗
1 = lB
m∗
1 = xB
m∗
2 = lB
m∗
2 =
(√
2 + 2
)
16 a (3.31)
and
piB
m∗
1 = piB
m∗
2 =
(√
2 + 2
)2
256 a
2. (3.32)
The equilibrium value of union utility is given by
Ωu(wB
m∗
1 , w
Bm∗
2 ) =
(√
2 + 72
)
32 a
2. (3.33)
3.3.5 Summary
We can summarize the results of Section 3.3 in Table 3.1 with A= simultaneous bargaining
without outside option, Am = simultaneous bargaining based on monopoly levels, B
= pattern bargaining without outside option and Bm = pattern bargaining based on
monopoly levels.
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Table 3.1: Outcomes under different bargaining regimes in autarky
Bargaining environment w∗1, w∗2 Ω∗u pi∗1, pi∗2
A 0.1 a 0.06 a2 0.09 a2
Am 0.25 a 0.125 a2 0.063 a2
B 0.25 a 0.125 a2 0.063 a2
Bm 0.36 a 0.153 a2 0.046 a2
It is straightforward to check that the union prefers bargaining environment Bm over
all other options, whereas the two firms will conversely opt for bargaining environment
A as it yields the highest profits compared to the other listed alternative bargaining
environments. This result confirms previous findings by Marshall and Merlo (2004). The
economic reason why unions prefer pattern bargaining over simultaneous bargaining lies
in the fact that a wage increase harms a firm independent of the wage rate paid by the
other firm, but less so if the own wage increase induces a corresponding wage increase at
the other firm as well. This effect is ensured by the concept of pattern bargaining, where
firms become less reluctant to agree to wage concessions as they are aware that this will
not harm their competitive standing in the market. With regard to outside options, we
find that a positive conflict payoff to the union di > 0 is beneficial to the union and
detrimental to the firms’ profits independent of the existing bargaining environment. We
can summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 The union prefers pattern bargaining over simultaneous bargaining and
finds itself in a better bargaining position with a positive conflict payoff independent of the
existing bargaining regime. The reverse case applies to firms, which prefer simultaneous
bargaining over pattern bargaining. Higher conflict payoffs to the union are detrimental
to the profits of the firms.
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3.4 FDI
Following an approach by Dinopoulos and Mezzetti (1991), we broaden our point of view
in this section by embedding the option to shift production abroad via horizontal FDI
into our model. The process of multinationalization is assumed to come at no additional
cost, but only firm 1 can produce abroad, while firm 2 continues to produce in its respec-
tive home country only. This creates an asymmetry in FDI capabilities which allows us
distinguish cases where the union might prefer one or the other firm to take on the target
role. Moreover, FDI can be used to serve domestic consumers only, while the foreign
wage rate w∗ is assumed to be of such nature that the marginal cost of producing abroad
exceeds the marginal cost of producing at home (implying that the domestic reservation
rate is lower than w∗), so that firm 1 has a clear preference to produce in home country.
Producing abroad, however, is assumed to yield positive profits overall (albeit being lower
compared to producing in home country), so that an internal solution of our model re-
quires Ψ1 > 0 under FDI.5 Given this setup, the option of FDI alters the nash bargaining
game as firm 1 gains an outside option which in case of disagreement turns into positive
reservation profits. This strengthens the bargaining position of the firm since FDI can be
used as a threat during the wage negotations. Note that just the (credible) threat of FDI
is sufficient to have an impact on the bargaining process as long as the potential profits
that are obtainable abroad are positive, which reduces the role of the foreign country to
an exogenous factor. The consideration of FDI has another important implication for
our model: if the union is not endowed with an outside option such that d2 = 0, Ψ1 as
outside-side option of firm 1 is based on monopoly profits. The reason for this lies in
the following argument: if wage negotiations between the union and firm 1 fail and the
union decides to go on strike, d2 = 0 implies that neither firm 1 or firm 2 can produce
in home country, which leaves firm 1 the opportunity to serve the domestic market from
abroad via FDI. In contrast, if wage negotiations between the union and firm 1 fail and
the union decides to go on strike while possessing a positive outside option d2 > 0, both
firms continue to share the domestic market as duopolists with firm 2 producing in home
country and firm 1 from abroad. Outside options d2 and Ψ1 would then be based on
5Our analysis can be extended to the case where fixed costs apply under FDI. They can be neglected
insofar in our model, as long as FDI returns positive profits to the firm.
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Cournot values depending on the foreign wage rate w∗:
xˆ1 = lˆ1 =
a+ w2 − 2w∗
3 . (3.34)
xˆ2(w∗, w2) = lˆ2 =
a+ w∗ − 2w2
3 (3.35)
pˆi1(w∗, w2) =
(
a+ w2 − 2w∗
3
)2
(3.36)
pˆi2(w∗, w2) =
(
a+ w∗ − 2w2
3
)2
. (3.37)
3.4.1 Pattern Bargaining and FDI without Outside Option
(CFDI)
This bargaining environment is similar to the setup of bargaining environment B (pattern
bargaining without outside-option), the only difference being that we allow the outside
option of the firm to be positive with Ψ1 > 0. Due to the asymmetry assumption in FDI
capabilities we must distinguish between two cases, where each firm adopts the role of
the target firm.
Firm 1 is the Target Firm
If firm 1 is chosen to be the target firm, the equilibrium wage rates are the solution to
w
CFDI∗1
1 = arg maxw [Ωu(w,w)] · [pi1(w,w)−Ψ1 (w
∗)] , (3.38)
w
CFDI∗1
2 = w
CFDI∗1
1 ,
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where Ψ1 is based on monopoly profits for given foreign wage rate w∗. The equilibrium
wage rates are then given by:
w
CFDI∗1
1 = w
CFDI∗1
2 =
λ (3a− λ) + 6w∗ (2a− w∗)− 7a2
4λ (3.39)
with:
λ ≡
 a (3w∗ − 2a) (4a− 3w∗) +
3
√
(a− w∗)2
(
102a3w∗ + 96a (w∗)3 − 31a4 − 147a2 (w∗)2 − 24 (w∗)4
)

1
3
.
Inserting the equilibrium wage rates into (3.3) and (3.4) yields
x
CFDI∗1
1 = l
CFDI∗1
1 = x
CFDI∗1
2 = l
CFDI∗1
2 =
λ (a+ λ)− 6w∗ (2a− w∗) + 7a2
12λ , (3.40)
pi
CFDI∗1
1 = pi
CFDI∗1
2 =
(
λ (a+ λ)− 6w∗ (2a− w∗) + 7a2
12λ
)2
(3.41)
for equilibrium output, employment and profits. Using (3.39) and (3.40) we obtain
Ωu(w
CFDI∗1
1 , w
CFDI∗1
2 ) (3.42)
=
(
aλ− 12aw∗ + λ2 + 6 (w∗)2 + 7a2
) (
3aλ+ 12aw∗ − λ2 − 6 (w∗)2 − 7a2
)
24λ2 .
as equilibrium value for the utility of the union.
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Firm 2 is the Target Firm
If firm 2 is chosen to be the target firm, the equilibrium wage rates are the solution to
w
CFDI∗2
2 = arg maxw [Ωu(w,w)] · [pi2(w,w)] , (3.43)
w
CFDI∗2
1 = w
CFDI∗2
2 ,
where (3.43) is identical to the nash bargaining problem in section 3.3.3. This implies that
the equilibrium values resulting from (3.43) are the same as under bargaining environment
B (pattern bargaining without outside option), where we assumed a closed economy. This
result stems from the assumption that firm 2 does not dispose of the FDI option which
implies Ψ2 = 0, while the pattern bargaining arrangement ensures that firm 1 accepts
the wage rate negotiated between the union and firm 2. This leaves us to replicate the
equilibrium results from bargaining environment B with:
w
CFDI∗2
1 = w
CFDI∗2
2 =
1
4a, (3.44)
x
CFDI∗2
1 = l
CFDI∗2
1 = x
CFDI∗2
2 = l
CFDI∗2
2 =
1
4a, (3.45)
pi
CFDI∗2
1 = pi
CFDI∗2
2 =
1
16a
2, (3.46)
Ωu(w
CFDI∗2
1 , w
CFDI∗2
2 ) =
1
8a
2. (3.47)
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3.4.2 Pattern Bargaining and FDI based on Cournot Levels
(CFDIm)
In this section we consider pattern bargaining and FDI in the presence of a positive
conflict payoff to the union d2 > 0. The union can build on d2 preceding failed wage
negotations between the union and firm 1. This subsequently leaves the union to enter
wage negotiations with firm 2 based on cournot values, as firm 1 remains as competitor
in the market via FDI. We must again distinguish between two cases, where each firm
adopts the role of the target firm.
Firm 1 is the Target Firm
If firm 1 is chosen to be the target firm, the equilibrium wage rates are solutions to
w
CFDI
m∗
1
1 = arg maxw
[
Ωu(w,w)− wˆ∗2 lˆ2 (wˆ∗2, w∗)
]
· [pi1(w,w)−Ψ1 (w∗, wˆ∗2)] , (3.48)
w
CFDI
m∗
1
2 = w
CFDI
m∗
1
1 ,
where wˆ∗2 constitutes the wage rate that applies when wage negotiations between the union
and firm 1 fail, resulting in a one-to-one wage bargaining situation based on equations
(3.35) and (3.37) between the union and firm 2 that takes the form
wˆ∗2 = arg maxw2
[
wˆ2lˆ2 (wˆ2, w∗)
]
· [pˆi2 (wˆ2, w∗)]
with
wˆ∗2 =
1
8 (a+ w
∗) (3.49)
as optimal wage outcome. By solving (3.48) we obtain the equilibrium wage rates
w
CFDI
m∗
1
1 = w
CFDI
m∗
2
2 =
φ (6a− φ) + w∗ (46a− 37w∗)− 17a2
8φ (3.50)
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with
φ ≡

2a
(
66aw∗ − 57 (w∗)2 − 17a2
)
+√√√√√√ −3757a6 + 30906a5w∗ − 114819a4 (w∗)2
+240844a3 (w∗)3 − 291699a2 (w∗)4 + 188922a (w∗)5 − 50653 (w∗)6

1
3
.
Inserting (3.50) rates into (3.3) and (3.4) yields equilibrium values
x
CFDI
m∗
1
1 = l
CFDI
m∗
1
1 = x
CFDI
m∗
1
2 = l
CFDI
m∗
1
2 =
φ (2a+ φ) + ω (−46a+ 37ω) + 17a2
24φ (3.51)
pi
CFDI
m∗
1
1 = pi
CFDI
m∗
1
2 =
(
φ (2a+ φ) + ω (−46a+ 37ω) + 17a2
24φ
)2
(3.52)
for output, employment and profits. The union utility in equilibrium is given by
Ωu
(
w
CFDI
m∗
1
1 , w
CFDI
m∗
1
2
)
(3.53)
= (φ (2a+ φ) + ω (−46a+ 37ω) + 17a
2) (φ (6a− φ) + ω (46a− 37ω)− 17a2)
96φ2 .
Firm 2 is the Target Firm
Similar to section 3.4.1, this bargaining environment corresponds to the case in which
firm 2 acts in the role of the target firm with d1 > 0. The equilibrium wage outcomes are
the solutions to
w
CFDI
m∗
2
2 = arg maxw [Ωu(w,w)− w
m∗
1 l
m
1 (wm∗1 )] · [pi2(w,w)] , (3.54)
w
CFDI
m∗
2
1 = w
CFDI
m∗
2
2 ,
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where (3.54) is identical to the nash bargaining problem under bargaining environment
Bm (pattern bargaining based on monopoly levels) in closed economy. The equilibrium
values are therefore given by
w
CFDI
m∗
2
1 = w
CFDI
m∗
2
2 =
(
10− 3√2
)
16 a, (3.55)
x
CFDI
m∗
2
1 = l
CFDI
m∗
2
1 = x
CFDI
m∗
2
2 = l
CFDI
m∗
2
2 =
(√
2 + 2
)
16 a, (3.56)
pi
CFDI
m∗
2
1 = pi
CFDI
m∗
2
2 =
(√
2 + 2
)2
256 a
2, (3.57)
Ωu(w
CFDI
m∗
2
1 , w
CFDI
m∗
2
2 ) =
(√
2 + 72
)
32 a
2. (3.58)
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3.4.3 Summary
The equilibrium results obtained in Section 3.4 are summarized in Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4:
Table 3.2: Wage rates under pattern bargaining and FDI
Bargaining environment w∗1, w∗2
CFDI1
λ(3a−λ)+6w∗(2a−w∗)−7a2
4λ
CFDI2 = B 0.25 a
CFDI
m
1
φ(6a−φ)+w∗(46a−37w∗)−17a2
8φ
CFDI
m
2 = Bm 0.36 a
Table 3.3: Union utility under pattern bargaining and FDI
Bargaining environment Ω∗u
CFDI1
(aλ−12aw∗+λ2+6(w∗)2+7a2)(3aλ+12aw∗−λ2−6(w∗)2−7a2)
24λ2
CFDI2 = B 0.125 a2
CFDI
m
1
(φ(2a+φ)+w∗(−46a+37w∗)+17a2)(φ(6a−φ)+w∗(46a−37w∗)−17a2)
96φ2
CFDI
m
2 = Bm 0.153 a2
Table 3.4: Profits under pattern bargaining and FDI
Bargaining environment pi∗1, pi∗2
CFDI1
(
λ(a+λ)−6w∗(2a−w∗)+7a2
12λ
)2
CFDI2 = B 0.063 a2
CFDI
m
1
(
φ(2a+φ)+w∗(−46a+37w∗)+17a2
24φ
)2
CFDI
m
2 = Bm 0.046 a2
At first glance, the results in the tables appear not to be clear-cut for a direct comparison,
but we can overcome this inconvenience by conducting a graphical analysis. We begin by
comparing the equilibrium wage rates for bargaining environments CFDI1 and CFDI2 which
implies a comparison of pattern bargaining regimes beween autarky and FDI for di = 0.
The equilibrium union wage rates for these bargaining environments are depicted by the
black lines depending on the foreign wage rate w∗ in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Wage rates under pattern bargaining and FDI without outside option
All values to the right of the red 45◦ line accommodate the assumption of our model
that the foreign wage rate w∗ is higher than the domestic counterpart. The figure also
accommodates the assumption that wage rates are positive and that the FDI payoff in
case of conflict must be positive Ψ1 > 0, which is fulfilled when w∗ < 10 for given a = 10.
Thus we obtain a corridor where the foreign wage rate must not be too low for wage rates
to be positive in general and not too high in order for FDI to be a credible threat. The
corresponding situation for bargaining environments CFDIm1 and CFDI
m
2 (depicted by blue
lines) is illustrated in Figure 3.2 where Ψ1 > 0 is fulfilled when w∗ < 6 for given a = 10.6
Given Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we can draw the conclusion that the introduction of FDI lowers
the union’s wage rate. This is because FDI, ceteris paribus, improves the bargaining
position of the firm. This assertion holds for all considered bargaining environments
independent of whether the union disposes of a conflict payoff or not.
Proposition 10 The introduction of FDI lowers the union’s wage rate under pattern
bargaining.
6The upper boundary for the foreign wage rate varies between bargaining environments depending on
the assumed outside option of the union. If di = 0, the conflict payoff to the firm is based on monopoly
values, which allows for a higher scope of the foreign wage rate compared to the case where di > 0, where
Ψ1 and consequently the foreign wage rate must be lower to yield Ψ1 > 0.
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Figure 3.2: Wage rates under pattern bargaining and FDI based on cournot levels
The intuition that lower wage rates are detrimental to the union’s utility is confirmed in
Figure 3.3 in which we portray the utility values for all four considered pattern bargaining
environments CFDI1 , CFDI2 , CFDI
m
1 and CFDI
m
2 .7
Figure 3.3: Union utility under pattern bargaining and FDI
7The bargaining environments where the positive conflict payoff to the union is positive with di > 0
are marked in blue again.
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Recall that CFDI2 and CFDI
m
2 correspond to the pattern bargaining environments B and
Bm which we already analyzed under autarky. The utility of the union is higher under
CFDI
m
2 = Bm than CFDI2 = B due to the positive conflict payoff that the union possesses
in the former bargaining environment, but both autarky cases yield higher utility when
compared to their bargaining counterpart CFDIm1 and CFDI
m
2 .8 This implies that the
union has a preference for national firm 2 and not multinational firm 1 to be the target
firm, because the concept of pattern bargaining ensures that the negative impact of FDI
on the union’s utility can be avoided when the solely domestically active firm is chosen
to carry out the target role. This can be verified when considering the nash bargaining
problems in section 3.4.1 and section 3.4.2, in which firm 2 is assumed to take on the
target role and where FDI as the outside option of the firm finds no entrance into the
wage bargaining scheme. Moreover, a direct comparison between bargaining environments
CFDI1 and CFDI
m
1 reveals that the union is better off when equipped with a positive conflict
payoff. The economic reason for this result goes beyond the argument that a positive
conflict payoff improves the bargaining position of the union, however, because a positive
conflict payoff to the union alters the conflict payoff to the firm as well. This is because
the possibility of a positive conflict payoff to the union allows firm 2 to remain active in
the market if wage negotiations fail, which forces firm 1 to base its conflict payoff upon
reservation profits with less market share (Cournot competition). The different conflict
payoffs to the firm depending on the conflict payoff to the union are depicted in Figure
3.4, where we can see that the conflict payoff to the firm is lower in pattern bargaining
environment CFDIm1 with d2 > 0.
Proposition 11 When confronted with FDI under pattern bargaining, the union is better
off in a more decentralized bargaining environment which allows for a positive conflict
payoff. Given the choice, the union prefers the domestic rather than the multinational
firm to be the target firm.
8Note that a direct comparison between bargaining environments CFDI2 = B and CFDI
m
1 discloses
the possibility for a situation where the union might prefer firm 1 to be the target firm. However, this
comparison does not really hold, since the bargaining environments differ in their assumed conflict payoff
to the union. If CFDI2 = B is amended by the option of a positive conflict payoff to the union as in
CFDI
m
2 , the union will prefer firm 2 to be the target firm again.
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Figure 3.4: Conflict payoffs depending on the outside option of the union
The equilibrium profits depending on the four considered pattern bargaining environments
CFDI1 , CFDI2 , CFDI
m
1 and CFDI
m
2 are illustrated in Figure 3.5, from which we can assert
that FDI is beneficial to both firms compared to autarky and even more so if the union
possesses no outside option.
Figure 3.5: Profits under pattern bargaining and FDI
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Proposition 12 FDI is beneficial to all firms under pattern bargaining compared to au-
tarky, if the FDI undertaking firm is chosen to be the target firm. This effect is strength-
ened when the union possesses no outside option.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of horizontal FDI on labor market outcomes
under pattern bargaining. Our main finding is that the threat of FDI has the power to
lower the bargained wage rate in the domestic country, because FDI improves the bar-
gaining position of the firm. This results in a lower payoff to the union and consequently
higher profits for the firms compared to the case of autarky. This effect is moderated if
the union possesses a positive conflict payoff, not only because it improves the bargaining
position of the union, but also because it alters the conflict payoff to the firm as well.
Furthermore, the assumed asymmetry between the firms’ capability to undertake FDI
reveals that the union prefers the domestic rather than the multinational firm to be the
target firm, as the concept of pattern bargaining ensures avoidance of the negative impact
of FDI on the union’s utility when the solely domestically active firm is chosen to carry
out the target role.
Our results can provide some explanations for empirical observations with regard to pat-
tern bargaining. In particular, we have identified a mechanism where the union’s outside
option functions in the way as to weaken the conflict payoff to the firm which softens the
negative impact of FDI on domestic wage bargaining outcomes. This provides a possi-
ble explanation for the observed trend towards less centralization in collective bargaining
systems for the case of pattern bargaining. Nevertheless, our framework offers only first
insights on the topic of pattern bargaining and FDI, making further research on this topic
neccessary.
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Appendix
For the purpose of completeness, we provide the concrete Nash bargaining problems used
in the model. Let us begin with the bargaining environments in autarky. For the case of
simultaneous bargaining without outside option (A) we obtain:
wA
∗
1 = arg maxw1
(
w1
a+ wA∗2 − 2w1
3 + w
A∗
2
a+ w1 − 2wA∗2
3
)
(
a+ wA∗2 − 2w1
3
)2
,
wA
∗
2 = arg maxw2
(
wA
∗
1
a+ w2 − 2wA∗1
3 + w2
a+ wA∗1 − 2w2
3
)
(
a+ wA∗1 − 2w2
3
)2
, (3.59)
where wA∗j denotes the anticipated equilibrium wage rate with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The Nash
bargaining problem for the case of simultaneous bargaining based on monopoly levels
(Am) is given by:
wA
m∗
1 = arg maxw1
(
w1
a+ wAm∗2 − 2w1
3 + w
A∗m
2
a+ w1 − 2wAm∗2
3 − w
A∗m
2
a− wAm∗2
2
)
(
a+ wAm∗2 − 2w1
3
)2
, (3.60)
wA
m∗
2 = arg maxw2
(
wA
m∗
1
a+ w2 − 2wAm∗1
3 + w2
a+ wAm∗1 − 2w2
3 − w
Am∗
1
a− wAm∗1
2
)
(
a+ wAm∗1 − 2w2t
3
)2
.
Turning to pattern bargaining, the Nash bargaining problem for the case without conflict
payoff to the union (B) is given by
wB
∗
j = arg maxw
(
w
a+ w − 2w
3 + w
a+ w − 2w
3
)
·
(
a+ w − 2w
3
)2
,
wB
∗
i = wB
∗
j (3.61)
with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, where the equilibrium wage rate is the same, independent of which
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firm adopts the role of the target firm. The Nash bargaining problem for the case of
pattern bargaining environment based on monopoly levels (Bm) yields
wB
m∗
j = arg maxw
wa+ w − 2w3 + wa+ w − 2w3 − 14a
(
a− 14a
)
2

(
a+ w − 2w
3
)2
,
wB
m∗
i = wB
m∗
j (3.62)
with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Equations (3.59) - (3.62) represent the autarkic perspective. We
now turn to the Nash bargaining cases in which FDI constitutes an outside option to firm
1. The Nash bargaining problem for the pattern bargaining case without outside option
(CFDI1 ), assuming that firm 1 takes on the role of the target firm, is given by
w
CFDI∗1
1 = arg maxw
(
w
a+ w − 2w
3 + w
a+ w − 2w
3
)((
a+ w − 2w
3
)2
−
(
a− ω
2
)2)
,
w
CFDI∗1
2 = w
CFDI∗1
1 . (3.63)
The Nash bargaining problem when firm 2 is chosen to act as target firm (CFDI2 ) is the
same as in (3.61). When both the union and firm 1 possess an outside option, the case
pattern bargaining and FDI based on Cournot levels (CFDIm1 ) applies with
w
CFDI
m∗
1
1 = arg maxw
wa+ w − 2w3 + wa+ w − 2w3 − 18 (a+ ω) a+ ω − 2
(
1
8 (a+ ω)
)
3

(a+ w − 2w3
)2
−
a+
(
1
8 (a+ ω)
)
− 2ω
3
2
 ,
w
CFDI
m∗
1
2 = w
CFDI
m∗
1
1 (3.64)
as corresponding Nash bargaining problem. The Nash bargaining problem when firm 2
takes on the role of the target firm (CFDIm2 ) is the same as in (3.62).
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